AUGUST 1960

CURRENT

THE SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL
FROM ALL SOURCES
ON THE FRONTIER PROBLEMS OF TODAY

TO THE READER

In the body of the magazine, all material to the right of the vertical rule is either direct quotation from or objective summary of the words of the author named in the margin.

The source is stated at the end of each item. For readers who would like to obtain full texts or subscribe to publications quoted, all sources are recapitulated in an alphabetical list which includes addresses, frequency of publication, single copy and subscription costs. This list begins on page 2.

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CURRENT'S SOURCES

Current's sources of material are unrestricted. They include general and special periodicals; academic journals and proceedings of learned societies; books, pamphlets and reports from commercial publishers, universities, foundations and funds, citizen organizations and special interest groups; daily and Sunday newspapers, especially editorials, columns and features; television and radio commentators, interviews, forums; government and intergovernment sources; statements of opinion leaders.

CURRENT'S AFFAIRS

Judging by the oratory at the national conventions of both parties, the challenge of new frontiers will be a matter of urgent concern during the Presidential campaign. This is a development of some satisfaction to us since the frontier problems of the day are Current's primary concern.

We are, of course, likely to differ with both the Republicans and Democrats about what a social frontier is. And certainly the Democrats and Republicans will differ with each other. It already appears that what the Democrats regard as frontiers to be crossed under their leadership are to the Republicans a series of demarcations already crossed under Eisenhower.

However, we will continue to be devoted to our own perception of the frontier problems. As we see it, a frontier problem has one or

more of three elements:

First, it seriously affects our democratic way of life. This does not mean that it need affect the political victory of the Democratic or Republican parties. Second, it is a problem that is raised by or takes into account our new knowledge in the physical and social sciences. Without this element the problem inevitably loses in relevance. Third, it is an unsettled problem and one about which there is controversy. By controversy we do not mean disputes among political factions and sectional partisans. The problem, for example, of segregation vs. anti-segregation will cause great bitterness in the coming campaign. But for concerned citizens this is a settled problem. The frontier problem is not whether to desegregate but how to desegregate.

We hope it is clear that Current supports no political party. However, in adhering to our own notion of what the frontier problems are and to our own standards of significant new material, we may make selections that seem to be politically partisan. For this we will have no apology. To be nonpartisan is not to avoid material simply because it comes from political sources. Nor will we feel it necessary to "balance" what we judge to be a significant contribution from a partisan source with an insignificant one from "the other side." We will, in short, subject political statements to the

same judgments that we apply to all other material.

We do suspect that the synthetic and ulterior nature of most campaign-time political literature will mean that little of it will find its way into Current. Two characteristics of campaign material put it in a special category. Nearly all of it is the result of ghost thinking and ghost writing (often about ghost issues). This may be inevitable, but we prefer to identify the ghosts. The other characteristic is that the thinking is geared to political victory rather than to problem-solving.

We respect the convictions of those who feel that the victory of their party is the way to problem-solving. But that's as far as we'll go.

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

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CURRENT

August 1960/Number 4

Current's Affairs

1

Sources for This Issue

2

Man's Relations to Man

-

The Negro South Divided 6
The White South Divided 8
Labor Divided 10
A New Mood 12

The Mass Media

13

The Southern Press on Race 13

Land to Live In

14

Human Values in the Slums 14
Human Values in Planning 15
The Importance of the City 15
How Commuters Can Have Trains 17
Military Hoarding of Public Lands 18
The Squatter Menace 19
The Mobile Tenth 20

A Life for the Aged

21

A Proposal 21

Making Democracy Work

22

Responsibility in the White House 22
The Headless Fourth Branch 23
Government by Condition 24
Federal Taxing for Local Spending 25
Birth Control and Public Policy 27

The Invasion of Space

28

The Frontier Problems for Government 28
Can We Communicate with the Stars? 29

Revolutionary Nationalism

31

Cuba, Communism and Hemispheric Unity 31

The Soviet Power Struggle

33

Mechanical Versus Moral Power 33 The Role of the Apparatchiks 36 The Effect of Domestic Dilemmas 37 The Cultural Impact of the Satellites 40

Emerging Africa

42

The Problems of Viability 42

Consensus on Foreign Policy

45

What the Experts Propose 45

The Organization of Peace

53

Mobilizing for Disarmament 53

Science and Public Issues

57

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Back Cover

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MAN'S RELATIONS TO MAN

THE NEGRO SOUTH DIVIDED

Following a journey through the South, a graduate student in government at Harvard University analyzes the effect on Negro politics of the student lunch-counter sit-downs.

Michael Walzer

"The first act has come off very well, but who is going to write the second?' A local realtor addressed this question to the assembled 'Central Committee' of the student movement in a large Southern city. The Negro businessman had been astonished, and only moderately gratified, by the sit-downs, the picketing, and the demonstrations which had taken place in a city he boasted of knowing so well and among a people he supposedly led. . . . Sternly, he offered them 'guidance' and warned them of 'irresponsible leadership.' Warning and offer were reiterated by other men at the same meeting—banker, insurance broker, lawyer, newspaper owner, head of the Negro YMCA—a gallery of notables. . . . Their advice, however, was coldly rejected by the student leaders. With a rather cruel politeness, the students refused to discuss their future plans.

"It was an extraordinary confrontation, this meeting between community and student leaders, an encounter of generations, and also of classes. The sons of the men who sat on one side of the room went to college (most of them) in the North. The parents of the students who sat on the other side of the room were (largely) nurses, coal miners, teachers, post-office employees, railroad porters. The student leaders themselves were the products of a vast expansion in Southern Negro college enrollment since the late forties—an expansion in which the schools obviously reached far beyond the limited middle class. Indeed, it is likely that more lower-class Negro children go to college in the South than in the North. And these, in largest part, are the 'new Negroes' who made the sit-downs possible.

"As a result of increased enrollments, there have appeared on the campuses large numbers of aggressive young men, fiercely hungry for success, for material goods and even fame. . . . They seem equally ready for a success story and a morality play, and I have no doubt that the civil rights movement is an adventure in which something of both is involved. . . .

"The limited Negro middle class, itself the product and in many ways the bulwark of a segregated society, no longer provides opportunity for the increasing number of talented, aggressive young men. . . . Student and parental ambitions alike push the young men beyond imitation and careerism, and further than the businessmen, the 'responsible' leaders, would have them go.

"Many still escape to the North, . . . into the permanent Army, . . . a few still dream of Paris. But . . . many more will decide to stay South. . . . For the South is home, and given any sense at all of power or possibility, they will stay home and make it livable. . . .

"At this point they will encounter the politics of their elders, of the business and professional men in the meeting room. This is a politics of back-door dealing, tough-minded, unidealistic, and sometimes successful.

The "new Negro" It is a politics of accommodation, but also of shrewd bargaining. The men who engage in it are likely to develop a curiously 'white' view of the Negro masses—that is, to view them as requiring just that paternal watchfulness and that cautious respectable representation which they themselves can provide. This makes them leaders, indeed, without any rankand-file following, men who speak for the Negro community, but who rarely speak to it....

"The Negro leaders deal for such favors as they can hope for or imagine: more money for the Negro high school, fair treatment in the petty courts, some new arrangement with the real estate board, the admission of a Negro to the police force, etc. All these represent real improvements in the conditions of life in a Southern town. . . . But the presupposition of all such bargaining is that the basic pattern of segregative of the segregation of the segregative of the

tion will not be altered. . . .

"To this limited kind of politics, students have no access, nor to the court battles as they are waged by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. They are not likely to be satisfied, at any rate, with anything short of personal encounter—something always eschewed by the older leaders. More than this, they do not know these leaders or the NAACP lawyers. Their own parents are hardly ever actively involved in politics. And they have inherited a considerable resentment toward the established middle class and its pretensions, a function of the distance the middle class has always insisted upon placing between itself and the mass of Negroes. The crucial fact is that the students, potentially middle class as they may be, do not identify themselves with the closely knit bourgeois elite of the Southern Negro world—and especially not with its politics."

Education, voting, housing and employment are obviously the key areas of segregation. "But segregation is also, and at its most common level, a

system of incidental insult. . . .

"Incidental insult is the daily experience of the Negro masses, much less so of the middle classes. Businessmen, schoolteachers, lawyers, live and work almost entirely in the Negro world. . . . They discover ways to avoid many, though by no means all, of the encounters in which insult is to be expected. But the people who work in the dozens of menial capacities . . . are drawn daily to the white business districts and the white suburbs. They ride the buses and search for a cheap place to eat downtown; they are in continual contact with white people, and usually with white people who are giving orders.

"So the students who marched downtown to the five-and-dime stores came into touch with the Negro masses, and challenged segregation precisely where it was most irritating to them. The counters and the streets were outside the political arena in which the older leaders operated. But the larger number by far of ordinary Negroes were also outside this political arena, not active citizens and not even represented. The students became their political surrogates and then their political instructors and finally (in some cases) their political colleagues. Inevitably, this process brought the students into close contact with the best of the preachers, who are the real leaders of the Negro masses. And it brought the students into the churches, which are the only free forums existing in the Negro community.

"The lead which the students gave resulted in the appearance of new forms of political organization among adults. These new organizations are centered in the churches. . . . Often considerable numbers of adults will

Old political favors

The personal challenge

work directly with the students in picketing and in mass demonstrations. Out of such organizations, perhaps, will come parents willing to force their children's way into the white schools and eligible voters trained in the perversities of Southern law and determined to register. But short of such a break with the habits of segregation as the students have initiated, such persons will never appear in sufficient numbers to make any real difference in Southern life.

"The membership of these grass-roots organizations is definitely lower class. Individual businessmen, lawyers and teachers are of course involved, and are often leaders. But the large body of the middle class has held aloof, in part because it feels threatened economically, in part because both the militancy and the religiosity of the mass movement is alien to its style....

The goal is assimilation "The key factor in the students' activity is the forward thrust of their new self-respect, their desire for equality—and their materialism. All these are summed up intellectually in what might be called a civil rights ideology. . . . Its goal is one of assimilation into American society and it would be blindness not to recognize this. . . .

"The students have . . . changed the method of this ideology from legalism to mass action. . . . The course which the demonstrations have taken is a matter of strategy and not ideals. On the other hand, the actual practice of nonviolent direct action obviously gives rise to feelings which are not merely strategic. This too is a test for the young Negro, an occasion for heroism, but it is also, simply, an education.

"The preachers and the theology students are the intellectuals of the Negro movement and its most frequent spokesmen. . . . But the precise connection between the religious and the political movement is more difficult to assess. . . .

"What is novel and creative is the appearance in Negro religion and the social gospel of a political ideology based on nonviolence and love. What is creative, again, is the students' commitment to direct mass action, their disenchantment with legalism. There is no reason to deplore the fact that a certain tension exists between these two, between Christian pacifism and the civil rights ideology. Tension of this sort has often been historically fruitful. At any rate, it is the inevitable result of the coming together of the students and the Negro masses." ("The Politics of the New Negro," Dissent, Summer 1960)

THE WHITE SOUTH DIVIDED

A Southern journalist reports in Look.

George E. McMillan

"The pertinent question today is not whether there are any white 'people of good will' so much as it is: Under what conditions would the white people who normally play leadership roles in the South take positive and constructive leadership on the racial question? . . .

"One of the least understood facts about the South is that there is a wider atmosphere of professed acquiescence there than [most] people outside the region realize. . . . Middle- and upper-class Southerners [agree] that 'the Negro's got to make some progress,' or 'something's got to give,' or 'someday we've got to integrate the schools.' . . . Thus, the upper-class Southerner distinguishes himself from the lower-class white person—whose principal characteristic in the past has always been his overt hatred for the Negro.

"Middle-class whites-ministers, teachers, professionals-say it is not

prejudice that holds *them* back but practicality. "There'd be trouble,' they say. What they do not say, and would not admit, is that they are as much in bondage as the Negro himself. In the past, when members of this class have let their consciences guide them into attempts to change the status quo, reprisal has been visited on them just as effectively, if not as violently, as it has on the Negro himself." ("Sit-Downs: The South's New Time Bomb," *Look*, July 5, 1960)

Two Southern liberals report on a divided South.

The editor of the Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer finds a relationship between arrogance and impotence.

Jonathan Daniels

"My increasing feeling is that we have not come to spiritual or intellectual grips with the forces let loose—and let loose at last—in this quarter-century. We have talked and written steadily, of course, about our two main and often monotonous subjects—industrialization and integration. . . .

"The great, significant thing that has happened to the South in this quarter-century is that the South—not the Negro but the South—has lost its understanding of its place and that in the strategy of our history our leaders have lost all contact with the understanding of power. Indeed, sometimes as I hear it in the oratory of our last substitutes for statesmen, the South seems a region which becomes most arrogant as its impotence increases.

"And the task of the South is to grow in greatness as it grows in wealth. That task becomes more difficult every day. My own opinion is that it becomes impossible in terms of the South described by our politicians. They will not even face the fact of the greatest importance in the South. It is that the meek have inherited the earth. Or, to say it otherwise, the lemmings have taken command. Many Southerners will feel only that the torrents have been loosed.

"What has happened is that those who have been ejected are the unsuspected masters of the house of our fathers. The Negroes have greater political power in America than the Southern politicians. . . .

"The least peoples have somehow gained a sense of their own part in the possibilities of our age. . . . Everywhere gain and loss have been intermingled, and anger and eagerness, too. Those who surge forward in hope may sink back under the new tyranny of others or the equal tyranny of obsolete thinking, obsolete listening, and defunct but still defiant politicians. . . . The hope for all that is left of this century in the South is that we may recognize change as the basis for thinking, not sulking." ("Political Arithmetic for the South," The South Atlantic Quarterly, Summer 1960)

Mr. Johnson is hopeful but emphasizes the need for immediate action.

Gerald W. Johnson

"The odds are plainly against the South, and if the region survives as more than a mere Bœotia, as an effective participant in American civilization, it will be only by dint of bitter travail, for it contends against itself as well as against adverse outward circumstance. . . .

"Time is running out, and the South must not only lift itself by its own bootstraps, but lift suddenly. The problem is what it has always been—to raise 30 per cent of the population, now handicapped, to the level of the rest, politically, economically, and culturally; the change is that it must be done more quickly than most of us had believed was imperatively necessary.

"But to accomplish the feat, the white South must first lift itself to a

moral and intellectual level higher than it has ever attained, or than has been attained by any dominant race anywhere in the world. It is a formidable task. It is so formidable that the Southern lower classes—lower, even though some have millions and pedigrees of enormous length—have shrunk back and renounced it. But the lower classes have always failed in every great emergency, so Faubus and Eastland and Talmadge are not of any great significance. The men who will count are the saving minority, unbroken and unbreakable, men who can respond to a challenge after the fashion of sturdy old Pierre-Samuel, the original Du Pont de Nemours. In 1816, when a swarm of troubles seemed about to overwhelm the new republic, he wrote to his old friend Jefferson: 'We are but snails, and we have to climb the Andes. By God, we must climb!'

"The South will climb. A romantic illusion? Possibly, but a living faith at this moment, nevertheless, and one not destroyed by reports from Little Rock, or even Poplarville, not shaken when presumably sane men talk of interposition, of concurrent majorities, of the compact theory of the Constitution. For it is precisely by wrestling and overthrowing the giants of madness and despair that the thews and sinews of the South will regain their old-time power, endowing it with the moral and intellectual vigor to become again the great instructor in political philosophy that it was when our history as a nation began." ("To Live and Die in Dixie," The Atlantic Monthly, July 1960)

LABOR DIVIDED

Business Week explains the growing division between Negro and organized labor.

"The split between Negro and labor, on the face of it, stems from a difference in emphasis, a choice in priorities. The Negro has only one priority—civil rights. Labor includes civil rights as one of many issues and inevitably regards it as a subject for political bargaining on social and economic issues.

"But the split has even deeper causes. It arises out of the Negro's declaration of independence from white leadership and white direction in the civil rights fight—the Negro view today is that the whites, in labor or in other fields, are unreliable race campaigners when the chips are down, and that only the Negro can carry through to race victories." ("Negro-Labor Division Widens," Business Week, July 9, 1960)

The only Negro vice-president of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations explains the recent formation of the Negro American Labor Council.

"The gulf of misunderstanding seems to be widening between the Negro community and the labor community. This is an unfortunate development.... But the misunderstanding will persist until the liberal and labor forces of the nation fully comprehend" that there is a "Civil Rights Revolution" in process and that the issues "are bigger and deeper than some anti-Negro action by a union here or there. The chief question with which we are concerned is the achievement of equality of Negro workers in the labor movement and industry.

"To be sure, this objective cannot be obtained by any piecemeal settlement of cases of discrimination by trade unions here or there. The realization of this goal will require a major, massive, systematic offensive, on the

Business Week

A. Philip Randolph

End of white leadership

What is black nationalism?

part of the AFL-CIO executive council and leadership, against the whole concept of discrimination and segregation in the labor movement. . . . In very truth, without the question of racial discrimination in trade unions being kept before the leadership and the membership, nothing is likely to be done about it. It is for this reason that the national Negro American Labor Council was formed."

Some of our liberal brothers "elect to view with alarm practically any and all criticisms of the AFL-CIO because of racial discrimination. In this respect they assume to speak for Negro trade unionists and Negro workers. This is easily understandable. The reason for this situation is that, for generations, everybody and anybody who was white has elected to speak for the Negro. Few people take the trouble or the time to attempt to find out whether the Negro wants to, or should, speak for himself. This attitude on the part of some of our liberal and labor friends is an outgrowth of the color caste system of our American culture which has given rise to certain racial habit systems that provide for the white man speaking for the black man.

"But this civil-rights revolution marks the end of this era of white leadership serving as the spokesman of Negro America."

The Negro American Labor Council "can give Negro trade unionists a sense of unity, both among themselves and with their white brothers. It... can help the AFL-CIO to cleanse the house of labor of color caste discrimination and segregation, which will help it win the confidence and faith in its declarations of democracy and freedom among the laboring masses of Africa and Asia.... It is not a labor union.... It has no visions of becoming a black Federation of Labor.... The Negro American Labor Council is necessary to achieve greater contact and communication among Negro trade unionists for the achievement of their common goals that involve their fight for equality.

"It is necessary because the AFL-CIO, though committed to a national policy against discrimination and segregation, will not voluntarily move toward the implementation of this policy unless it is caused to move, and it cannot be caused to move except through an organization which is committed to the elimination of discrimination and segregation. . . .

"We have been asked: 'Will the Negro American Labor Council promote black nationalism?' While the Council does not accept black nationalism, it recognizes its virtues as well as its vices. What is black nationalism?

"It is, basically, the Negro's reaction-behavior pattern to white nationalism. . . . It is an expression of fear and frustration, despair and desperation on the part of the Negro, with the violence of race hate. It is a bitter outcry against the empty and mocking, conservative, liberal, religious and labor, white paternalism. It's a direct, if awkward, expression of belief in the simple fact that the salvation of a people must come from within—that our friends may help us, but they cannot save us.

"One of the dangers of black nationalism is that it tends to breed hatred against white people merely because they are white, not because they have committed some wrong against Negroes. . . .

"Black nationalism tends to develop into a conspiracy against Negroes themselves, by opposing the Negroes' fight for freedom on the grounds that freedom from discrimination and segregation will lead to racial mixing and the loss of proper devotion to the black man's African heritage—which is both folly and a fallacy....

"Black nationalism is unsound because it disallows contact between the races. Without contact there cannot be communication, and without communication there breed suspicions, doubts, fears and frustrations that prevent understanding, confidence and cooperation between Negro and white workers. . . .

"The basic remedy for black nationalism—which can become a danger to social peace, as white nationalism is a danger to social peace—is the abolition of white nationalism, which expresses itself in lynchings, mob law, disenfranchisement, segregation and discrimination. . . .

"While the Negro American Labor Council rejects black nationalism as a doctrine and practice of racial separatism, it recognizes the fact that history has placed upon the Negro, and the Negro alone, the basic responsibility to complete the incompleted Civil War revolution through keeping the fires of freedom burning in the Civil Rights revolution. It is well-nigh axiomatic that only he who wears the shoe can feel the pinch.

"Only the Negro, who feels the sting and humiliation of racial discrimination and segregation, can be depended upon uncompromisingly to fight in labor unions, government, industry, the church, and schools." (Address, Fifty-first Annual Convention, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, St. Paul, Minn., June 24, 1960)

A NEW MOOD

Three leaders of the integration movement look ahead. The national chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality:

Charles R. Oldham

"The sit-in created the opportunity for every citizen, white and Negro, to participate meaningfully on an individual level in a constructive protest against discrimination at the lunch counter. Our goal now is to translate this constructive protest in wider areas. . . . We must devise modifications of the concept of direct nonviolent action for the unexplored areas of voter registration, education, housing and employment." (Address, CORE convention, June 29, 1960)

A Methodist minister, expelled from Vanderbilt University's Divinity School because of his participation in sit-ins:

Reverend James M. Lawson, Jr. "There is no doubt that the sit-ins will continue and will spread. They will be extended to more communities throughout the nation and they will be broadened to include far more than the original objectives. . . . The talking period [in race relations] is over. The movement is saying clearly that there can be no doling out of freedom in a patronizing way by the white man to the Negro. Decisions that effect the Negro must be made with him and by him." (Address, Fisk University Race Relations Institute, June 21, 1960)

The chief counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund:

Thurgood Marshall

"This isn't just a question of a hamburger or a cup of coffee, and both sides know it. You can get just as good hamburgers in a Jim Crow greasy spoon as you can in the five-and-dime, and most of these kids don't even drink coffee yet. What they're protesting is the whole rotten mess. They are demanding nothing less than the end of segregation in the South. They're tired of having only 6 per cent of the Negro children in integrated schools six years after the Supreme Court decision. They're tired of being denied the right to vote in the South, and they're tired of not being able to find decent jobs in Chicago or decent housing in New York." (Address, Fisk University Race Relations Institute, June 24, 1960)

THE MASS MEDIA

THE SOUTHERN PRESS ON RACE

How do Southern newspapers deal with racial stories? A professor of journalism at the University of North Carolina analyzes the handling of eight stories by five major Southern dailies, a Negro weekly, and The New York Times.

Walter Spearman

"It is obvious to even the casual reader of Southern newspapers that a great amount of space is being given to racial news. Racial conflict still gets greater coverage than racial cooperation, for both newspapers and their readers still consider conflict more newsworthy and more readable than lack of conflict.

"Southern newspapers are also giving more attention to Negro news, even news that is not based upon conflict. Many of the papers segregate their Negro news by placing it all on one page; others use Negro news wherever it fits into the newspaper's various departments."

Some conclusions:

"1. Southern newspapers generally are doing a conscientious, thorough, and predominantly fair job of reporting racial news. They are conforming more closely to the accepted standards of good journalism than the atmosphere of the times or the charges of their critics would indicate.

"2. Chief source of the news is the wire services, with some slight effort to add local interviews or tie-ins, when pertinent. News may be made more or less sensational, given more or less slant, by the way wire service stories are cut or by the headlines placed above them.

"3. The editorial bias of a paper is more likely to be revealed in the use or non-use of certain interpretive or color side stories than in the handling

of an important event.

"4. By-line stories of a newspaper's Washington correspondent or of a local reporter sent to cover a nearby racial news event are more likely to show bias than the principal story from the wire services.

"5. A story of racial news may be pushed out of place by an important local story," such as a State legislative session or the Kentucky Derby.

"6. Southern newspapers are not taking advantage of their opportunity to secure color and human interest stories in addition to the principal stories of an event from the wire services.

"7. Display of Negro news, use of Negro pictures, and attitudes toward Negroes as sources of news vary widely among Southern newspapers.

"8. Attentive reading of Negro newspapers in the South would give Southern readers a very different conception of Negro attitudes, emotions, and points of view.

"9. Southern newspapers are still unaware of the effect some of their racial stories may have on readers in other countries.

"10. Southern newspapers are doing a better job in giving their readers the facts about racial events than in revealing their meaning and interpreting the points of view of the people involved." (Racial Crisis and the Press. Available through Readers Service)

LAND TO LIVE IN

HUMAN VALUES IN THE SLUMS

The president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a member of the New York City Housing and Redevelopment Board, argues that destruction of existing slum buildings does not, and probably should not, transform residents into middle-class households.

"We speak of slum eradication and ridding the city of all slums in a decade. Seldom do we pause to consider the human elements in the rise, development and perpetuation of slums or the human costs of their clearance. Thus, emphasis is placed upon the buildings in the slums and little attention is paid to the people who inhabit them or the reaction of the rest of the population to these people....

"Slum occupancy—an inevitable first step in urbanization of most newcomers [in the past—has become] a permanent identification for most urban Negroes, Mexican-Americans and Indians, as well as a large proportion of Puerto Ricans." Thus nonwhite families are forced to remain in slums and blighted areas regardless of their aspirations, values, achievements, or behavior patterns.

"In a middle-class-oriented society, slums serve an important role. By housing the most obvious of the deviants as well as the disadvantaged, the discouraged, and most individuals identified with groups marked for discrimination regardless of individual characteristics, they solace those whose values dominate the social order. Many are able to talk impersonally about 'the poor unfortunates' or damn the 'brutes.' Others identify delinquency with certain ethnic or geographic origins and enjoy a double dividend of racial superiority and social irresponsibility. . . .

"Middle-class families and low-income families with middle-class orientation are running away from households with social problems and deviant behavior. And this cuts across racial lines. In the private housing sector, whites resent and flee from some other whites as well as from Negroes, Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans; and in public housing, whites and nonwhites resent and flee from some nonwhites. In those few instances where they have the opportunity, middle-class Negroes move away from whites, Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans as well as from other Negroes whose values and patterns of living are incompatible with middle-class standards.

"Revitalizing cities is more than a real-estate operation. It involves reaching and assisting the residents of slums and blighted areas, learning more about them and society's attitudes toward them in the process. In doing so, we will doubtless come to appreciate that some of their values—although strikingly different from those of the dominant groups in our society—are not only utilitarian but worthy of emulation. Many of their patterns of behavior, while unacceptable to the majority, may well be compatible with successful urban living; others will require modification. To the degree that society discovers how to encourage these adjustments, it will develop tools to arrest the spread of blight and accelerate urban

Robert C. Weaver

Race is not the basis

renewal.... Without a co-ordinated program for human rehabilitation and a re-examination of the human values of urban life, demolition of slums will probably result in greater dispersal of blight.

"Most social scientists, writers, teachers, and social workers, as well as public officials, belong to the middle class and frequently assume, unconsciously perhaps, that . . . only middle-class-oriented families can make an effective adaptation to urban life. . . . [But] we shall not quickly create a vast number of households with middle-class values out of people who have long been neglected, misunderstood, and discriminated against. . . .

"Cities, by definition, are cosmopolitan areas composed of a diversity of economic and social classes. . . . If American cities are to be healthy, their inhabitants must have the tolerance of difference that urban life implies. Should we fail to give substance to such tolerance, current investments to renew our cities will prove to be most unproductive. And perhaps they should fail, for unless the human values of urban life are recognized and stressed, the city has no raison d'être." ("Human Values of Urban Life," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, May 1960)

HUMAN VALUES IN PLANNING

The dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School urges more political responsibility in town and city planning.

No plan can actually be neutral in terms of the values it serves or fails to serve. Thus if a master plan ignores the elements of land use configuration which conduce to racial segregation and ghettos, it will perpetuate existing conditions and practices of inequality. "The effect of acreage zoning (or shall I say Ivy League Socialism?), for example, is to deny people of very limited means access to some of the most physically desirable parts of the urban land area."

If a plan is to be properly related to human values, those values must be adequately articulated and the value judgments must be made by politically responsible organs of government before the plan is begun. The role of planners and planning commissions is not to by-pass representative policy-making bodies on the ground that they are political, but to assist them by assembling and analyzing relevant data and by projecting the implications of ideas under consideration. ("Planning for the Realization of Human Values," Address, National Planning Conference, American Society of Planning Officials, Miami Beach, May 23, 1960)

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CITY

A professor of architecture at Columbia University sees a need to concentrate on cities as centers and centers within cities.

"For the first time in Western history, it is seriously being argued that the city itself is no longer viable . . . [that it is] simply destined to dissolve, distributing its amenities in a thin even film of suburban houses, shopping centers, and country day schools across the countryside.

"All this is vulgar nonsense. . . . [It] is premised upon the supposition that a mere technology of telecommunications can become a substitute for that concentration of social and cultural forces which is so unique to the city and so essential to civilization. When, here in New York, we speak of financial centers, garment centers, publishing centers, or when we refer

Jefferson B. Fordham

James Marston Fitch

to Detroit as the center of one industry or Hollywood of another, we are dealing not in metaphor but in the most concrete of social realities. Such centers are unique; there is no technological substitute for their germinal powers. Personal, face-to-face contact; daily friction and exposure to ideas; continual cross-fertilization from various elements in a given field-these are the essential properties of the center.

"The center, in other words, cannot be decentralized. Modern technology may permit remote control of this or that phase of production. Modern transport and communication may make it possible for one national center to control a national industry. But the directing urban center is no more susceptible of subdivision and decentralization across the countryside than would be the human brain over the nervous system. . . .

"In so far as the future of the city is the subject of any responsible thinking at all, this thinking seems to be dominated by a kind of mad laissez-faire-ism. Subjected to a whole set of anarchic and destructive forces, the city is expected to prove itself, medieval style, in a kind of trial by fire and water. If it survives . . . well and good; if it succumbs, good riddance. This preposterous attitude permits the subsidy of all sorts of forces hostile

to the city and yet forbids any defensive response. . . .

"A part of our dilemma is no doubt due to our basic misconception of the function of a street, our persistent inability to see the difference between the street and the road. . . . A road, properly speaking, is for moving people and goods from where they are to where they want to get, while a street, properly speaking, is for people who are already where they want to be. Thus a road can be indefinitely widened or extended. Since transport is its only function, it can be designed to accept any type of vehicle in any quantity, moving at-relatively speaking-any rate of speed. But a city street has the incomparably more delicate task of facilitating and encouraging commerce and social intercourse. To do this successfully, it must be designed for the pedestrian, kept to his scale in time and space. . . . Without the social street, the social center cannot function. It is not the buildings but the spaces between them which constitute the essential urban tissue. . . .

"The huge mass of the Empire State Building is hermetically sealed against the pedestrian-no one without compelling business would ever dream of entering it-while the Plaza at Rockefeller Center pulls pedestrians like a lodestone [and has become the center of life in mid-Manhattan]. The dramatic difference in these two [contemporary] projects lies in the very ancient device of grouping buildings around a hollow, traffic-

free pedestrian square.

"Fortunately, the lesson of the Center has not gone entirely unobserved. Other efforts at the reconstitution of new urban nuclei are beginning to appear. Of these, architect Victor Gruen's proposal for the downtown center of Fort Worth is by far the most comprehensive and farsighted. . . . It proposed, among many things, to solve the traffic problem by excluding all private cars from the central city streets which were to be converted into landscaped pedestrian malls. It proposed to establish a ring of parking facilities and suburban bus stations around the periphery of the central business district; and the connection of these to the center by means of a dense network of shuttle buses.

"Thanks to the National Housing Act of 1949 (and its broadened provisions in subsequent years) we begin to have the means, if not yet the policy, for urban renewal. So we may expect more projects along the lines of the Fort Worth plan. So far, however, many of these urban renewal projects seem, to me at least, to be merely clusters of upper-class apart-

A street is not a road

The ancient square

Class architecture ment houses. Even where these projects are not touched with scandal or the suspicion of profiteering, there must be grave doubts about the wisdom of clearing slums only to replace them with luxury housing. This pattern of giant towers standing in landscaped deserts is class architecture of the most blatant sort. It is also basically anti-urban in its philosophy. . . . For it is always multiplicity and variety of use and tenancy which make for truly cosmopolitan experience.

"Larger in scale and more complex in scope are such urban redevelopment projects as that for Lincoln Center in New York. Although this development promises to replace a lot of shabby old buildings with a cluster of bright new ones, many planners are seriously questioning the wisdom of concentrating all these theaters and concert halls into one comparatively small area. Aside from the easily imagined traffic jams at curtain time and the wasteland emptiness at other times, there is the fundamental question as to whether or not effective 'cultural centers' can actually be built in so arbitrary and simplicistic a fashion. Perhaps these new facilities might better have been fitted into the Times Square theater district; or perhaps they should have been strategically placed around the city to serve as the nuclei of new urban regeneration. The very fact that such questions are raised shows the complexity of the problems which face us, once the decision to rebuild the city is made.

"Clearly, what we require is a national policy toward the city. Such a policy must obviously be broad enough to regulate the relationship between the central city and its suburbs and hinterland. One of the first objectives would be to preserve the special social and physical characteristics of each of these districts. It will not be enough to rehabilitate the central city by itself; the mindless squalor which today surrounds and isolates it must also be cleaned up." ("In Defense of the City," Proceedings of the

Academy of Political Science, May 1960)

HOW COMMUTERS CAN HAVE TRAINS

A professor of transportation at Northwestern University School of Business proposes two reforms to save commuter railroads, based on his studies in the U.S. and in Europe.

Stanley Berge

"Big cities need co-ordinated railroads quite as much as co-ordinated highways and air and water transport.

"A fact too often overlooked . . . is that efficient movement of freight within and across the urban area is just as important as efficient movement of passengers. Hence, any future planning for railroad commuter services and other passenger services should aim at maximum utilization of tracks, equipment, and other facilities by both freight and passenger trains."

A necessary step is elimination of "stub-end" terminal stations, so that trains can "move freely through the central city, making stops at a series of convenient platform stations instead of forcing all passengers to enter and leave all trains at a single, congested, downtown location." Stub-end terminals afflict Chicago, which has five, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay cities, Boston, Philadelphia-Camden, and New York, where all railroads from New Jersey except the Pennsylvania terminate on the west bank of the Hudson River.

Through stations can handle at least four times as many trains per track per hour as terminals and need no switching facilities. Their virtues are obvious where they exist in the U.S. and abroad. A coordinated metropoli-

tan track system would not only make passenger traffic more convenient and efficient, but reduce the need for miles of extra freight track.

Another improvement with major consequences would be replacement of the obsolete rail electrification system still used in this country-1500volt direct current, which requires high-tension transmission lines parallel to the rights of way and costly substations with transformers and rectifiers every four to eight miles.

A postwar French development, the 25,000-volt alternating current trolley system, provides almost maintenance-free operation at speeds up to 205 miles per hour. Power can be fed into the system directly from the public utility grid, without costly installations, every thirty to fifty miles. This system is being adopted in Britain, Russia, Turkey, Portugal, India, China, and Japan. ("How Commuters Can Have Their Trains," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1960)

MILITARY HOARDING OF PUBLIC LANDS

Mr. Lofton is an editorial writer for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.

John Lofton

"The modern menace to wilderness America . . . derives not alone from simple human pressure for living and producing space, but from changed land use unrelated to consumer requirements. A major agency of this change is the military establishment, which is not noted for its devotion to conservation. Since 1937 the total amount of land held by the armed forces has expanded from 3 million acres to some 31.3 million acres, an increase of more than 1,000 per cent. In the past twenty years the average annual increase in military land use has been greater than the one million additional acres now being diverted each year to industrial and residential

"Not all this expansion in military land use was the result of wartime mobilization. Between 1944 and 1959 military land holdings rose by 11 million acres. As late as 1955, when Congress called a temporary halt to the trend, the armed services were taking over land at the rate of 50,000 acres a week. Today, within the forty-eight contiguous states, the services control a domain as large as the state of Virginia. And there are unmistak-

able signs that they would like to make it much larger.

"An important reason for expansion of military real estate, aside from the long-range growth of the armed forces, has been the increasing emphasis on air warfare with nuclear weapons. . . . As military craft evolve into nuclear rockets and space ships, the use of the skies and the land by mechanical birds will become still more intrusive. Demands for testing sites, such as that at Cape Canaveral, and for launching sites for operational missiles, are likely to multiply. . . .

"The effect of military flight on wilderness areas and their wild residents is becoming evident. Although the Air Force has existed as a separate service for only twelve years, it already controls more land in the continental United States (Alaska excluded) than the total allocated for all wildlife refuges. Yet the Air Force has shown on several occasions in recent years that it covets the limited space set aside for hard-pressed birds and

"Doubts were cast on the genuiness of the military land hunger when an Air Force Board of Inquiry disclosed that, of 14.4 million acres held by the Air Force on October 9, 1957, 5.7 million acres were, in fact, in excess of that service's current and long-range needs. . . .

Runways and launching sites "As a result of the exertions of [Congressman] Engle and his committee, Congress in 1958 passed a law requiring Congressional approval of any withdrawal for military use of more than 5,000 acres of public land....

"The Engle Act has produced a marked improvement in the attitude of the services toward their stewardship over Federal lands. But the new statute, constructive though it is, leaves considerable latitude for capricious military pre-emptions of Federal land. Its requirement of Congressional approval for withdrawals of more than 5,000 acres applies only to 'public lands,' a distinctive term which embraces those limited areas put within the public domain by specific act of Congress, and those much more extensive areas to which the United States holds title as a consequence of cession by international agreement or treaty. But 'public lands' do not include those federally owned tracts acquired by purchase, condemnation or as gifts. These 'acquired lands'—consisting of some 50 million acres and including many of the wildlife refuges of the East—are not covered by the provisions of the Engle Act. . . .

"Without the leverage of a Congressional hearing, opponents of military inroads on wildlife and park preserves would be hard put to find out whether the Air Force and other services have improved the machinery

for determining their land needs. . .

"By extending to 'acquired lands' the necessity of legislative approval for changes in the status of large tracts, Congress could provide protection to many significant areas not covered by the Engle Act. But such an amendment (not yet introduced by anyone) is only one of several essential statutory safeguards if the natural landscape is to be maintained undisturbed in a few places for the quiet enjoyment of space age citizens. Another measure is the Wilderness Bill which would preserve in their primeval state certain undeveloped areas of Federal land (about 2 per cent of the total), including qualifying wildlife refuges. . . . A third key item of legislation is the National Seashore Bill (two versions were offered in the last Congress) which would authorize the National Government to acquire a few of the rapidly disappearing sections of uninhabited ocean front for public enjoyment. . . .

"Americans should realize that existing and proposed conservation programs represent little more than a holding action in the effort to perpetuate the natural America of the past. Present Federal waterfowl refuges constitute but a minimal national attempt to compensate for the 120 million acres of former waterfowl habitat already appropriated by agriculture and industry before the conservation system was well started. . . . By the end of the century, according to Winthrop Rockefeller, . . . the United States will need forty times the land now set aside for the national parks and scenic areas. The present trend offers little hope of attaining the goal." ("Military Sites vs. Public Parks," *The New Leader*, June 27, 1960)

THE SQUATTER MENACE

A former New York State Rent Administrator, now visiting professor of housing at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, isolates a growing menace to progress in the underdeveloped nations.

Charles Abrams

"Failure to grapple with the land and housing problems in rural and urban areas is offering a threat not only to family health and welfare but to political stability as well. The proportion of rural and urban squatting in Venezuela is about 60 per cent and in Caracas it is 35 per cent of the

Legislative proposals

A threat to democracy

population. In the mountains overlooking the capital, people live in shacks made of cardboard, old boxes, tin and scrap, and without the most elementary sanitary facilities. In the rural areas of Venezuela the thatched roofs are a breeding place for vermin and one of the major causes of disease and death.

"The situation is as bad elsewhere in the world. In Ankara, Turkey, for example, the squatting population is about 45 per cent; in Karachi, Pakistan, 33 per cent; in Manila, 20 per cent; in Hong Kong, 18 per cent.

"With urbanization and migration at their beginnings, illegal expropriations of land pose a dangerous threat to democratic institutions. Squatters have herded into the national capitals and other political nerve centers. They have frequently organized to resist displacement by political pressures where possible and by force if necessary. Squatting is frustrating proper city growth and fostering a growing cynicism toward property rights and a disrespect for law.

"With a proper program the seeds of discontent that lurk beneath the squatter's hovel could be turned into a harvest of goodwill and hope. That one postwar democracy after another has recently fallen has been at least partly due to the fact that government policy (including our own) has tended to echo broad democratic generalizations without providing the

essential roots out of which democratic institutions grow.

"The earliest exercises of government power are occurring in the fields of land, housing and city planning. Here the political patterns are being set for property rights and for the evolving relationships between government and property and between the family and the political institutions. Out of the need for protecting the right to land and a decent house will come the necessity for respecting each other's rights, respect for contract, courts and the rule of precedent.

"In most cases there is enough urban land to accommodate the newcomers. Most of the local materials can be utilized too. What is needed mainly is the development of know-how, organization, training, finance,

land policy and some direct assistance with materials.

"With a relatively small outlay and some imagination we can make a major contribution not only to the welfare of these people but to the identification and reinforcement of the principles which all democratic people should share." (Letter to *The New York Times*, July 12, 1960)

THE MOBILE TENTH

A research and planning consultant of the Mobile Homes Research Foundation complains of a "very serious shortage" of parks for America's 1,250,000 mobile homes.

Marshall K. Powers

"Over the past two years, the mobile home industry has accounted for more than one out of ten new housing starts." With some three and one-half million Americans already living on wheels, "the industry expects to add upwards of 150,000 new units to the existing supply during 1960. These figures should indicate something of the problem. . . .

"A place for this new housing product . . . must and will be found. . . . If the planning profession is not equal to this challenge, the pattern of the years past will undoubtedly be repeated, with the uncontrolled, unregulated, and largely undesirable growth of mobile home parks in areas unsuited for residential use." (Address, National Planning Conference, American Society of Planning Officials, Miami Beach, May 24, 1960)

A LIFE FOR THE AGED

A PROPOSAL

The Democratic Senator from Michigan introduces a bill establishing a United States Office of Aging.

Senator Pat McNamara "There are now 16 million Americans over age 65, and 20 million will be over 65 just fifteen years from now. We are faced with a population explosion at the far end of life's cycle. . . .

"What objectives should the nation seek for and with its senior citizens? . . . Right now, we are without a central core of direction and coordination in this field. The U.S. Office of Aging would constitute that core. . . . Someone has to have full-time responsibility, backed by professional knowledge and ability and the strong desire to represent effectively in the Federal Government a group now buffeted about from agency to agency in fragmented fashion."

The functions of the new agency:

"It would serve as a federal clearing-house for information from all the public and private groups which concern themselves with the problems of the elderly.

"It would stimulate programs for the elderly on the federal, state, and local levels and would assist the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to make recommendations in this field.

"It would promote research and demonstration projects, such as senior centers, counseling programs, and studies of what social, recreational, and training programs and facilities are needed in the field.

"It would make possible the coordination of the many isolated programs for the elderly now being carried on by such independent agencies as the Veterans' Administration and the Housing and Home Finance Agency. . . .

"It would provide stimulation, guidance and assistance to states and localities, to organizations and groups working in the field of aging through technical, professional advice and conferences.

"It would administer grants to public and nonprofit groups to establish and evaluate demonstration programs of various kinds to enlarge the civic contributions of our senior citizens and to enhance their personal growth.

"It would identify unmet needs and formulate plans for dealing with them.

"It could work with industry, labor, farm and other groups for greater utilization of the potentials of older citizens."

The new agency would help achieve the following objectives for the aged:

"1) An adequate income. 2) The best possible physical and mental health. 3) Suitable housing. 4) Full restorative services. 5) Equal opportunity to employment. 6) Retirement in health, honor, and dignity. 7) Pursuit of meaningful activity. 8) Efficient community services when needed. 9) Immediate benefit from proven research knowledge. 10) Freedom, independence, and the free exercise of individual initiative." (Speech, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, July 1, 1960)

Objectives

MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WHITE HOUSE

A journalist with long experience in Washington proposes reforming the office of the Presidency.

Blair Bolles

"The President's difficulty is to find the sort of organization that can facilitate his governing competently without his being overwhelmed by the tremendous apparatus at his command, and at the same time to maintain his role of moral spokesman for the nation.

"His own White House organization has grown in step with the growth of the government, but the sheer size of his own immediate organization has not enabled the President to cope with the size of the government as a whole. On the contrary, the growth of the White House organization has promoted the spread of corruption. . . .

"The shift of power [from city and state governments to the Federal] has merely shifted the focus of corruption. The rot of the state legislatures is the rot of Washington. The power that was abused in Wall Street is abused also in Washington. As the personification of general power, the President is caught with the task of safeguarding the power from the kind of sordid misuse which the muckrakers found scattered around the country.

"The President is pinched in a moral scissors. One blade is the moral obligation for the honest conduct of the public business. The other blade is the moral obligation to stand by one's friends and associates. The scissors cut at the modern Presidents more sharply than they did at most of the Presidents of the past. The shift of power forces the modern President to rely on many more associates and subordinates in carrying out his responsibilities than were dreamed of when our parents were young. . . .

"The opportunity is at hand for a partial step toward the establishment of a system of government in which the legislative branch would be directly responsible for administrative activities within the government. Let the President retain his powers as the Chief Executive and the central figure supervising the functions of the Cabinet departments and other policy-making agencies. At the same time let Congress attach the commissions, the independent regulatory agencies, to itself, and expand from its historic condition as simply a legislature into a legislature with administrative duties. There are precedents for it. The Library of Congress, the Government Printing Office, and the General Accounting Office are satellites of Congress and not of the White House.

"The foremost advantage in attaching the commissions to Congress, and elevating the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the President of the Senate into chief secretary . . . of these regulatory agencies, is that at last the responsibility of those offices would be precisely fixed. . . .

"The lifting of the veil of secrecy from the White House is one of three political actions which should help Presidents to protect themselves from betrayal by favoritism and even corruption. The other two actions are (first) to reduce the number of personnel in the White House and in the Executive

The moral scissors

Office; and (second) to reassemble the agencies of the executive branch into the domains of the various Cabinet departments.

"Now there are at least thirty agencies floating freely in space. They are universes self-contained. These petty autonomies, aside from the independent regulatory commissions among them which should be attached to Congress, could be made at home within the agencies that are directly responsible to the President. . . .

"Responsibility in government destroys corruption. The goals of ending secrecy, slimming down the White House organization, turning the regulatory commissions over to Congress, and returning to the principle of government through departments instead of unattached agencies all have one purpose. The purpose is to establish the responsibility for good government in Washington....

"The American President is a prisoner of the number and prerogatives of his assistants. His personality is stifled, and his moral leadership is filtered through the Lilliputians who surround him. His office has been corruptly tainted on occasion because his position is weak, and for years his subordinates have taken advantage of that weakness. Responsibility falls upon him, but he has lost control over the carrying out of his responsibilities." (Men of Good Intentions)

THE HEADLESS FOURTH BRANCH

A professor of political science at the University of California urges abolishing independent regulatory agencies.

"Administration is not something apart from politics but an integral part of a unified, if complex, political process. Unless politics is recognized as essential and ineradicable in the total administrative process, we run the risk of creating a politically sterile bureaucracy responsible not to the President and the people but to special interests which know what they want and how to get it....

"A good example of all this can be seen in the so-called independent regulatory commissions. In establishing these agencies, Congress has sought to immunize them from politics. This it has done by placing them outside the executive establishment. . . .

"Theoretically, this attempt at political immunization is justified on the ground that the commissions have not only administrative or executive duties but also legislative and judicial responsibilities as well. But this, it seems to me, should argue for more, not less, political responsibility. . . . Too often, the so-called independent commissions appear to be agencies not of the public, but of the powerful interest groups they are appointed to regulate." Pressure politics is as much a part of the administrative as of the legislative process. It can be minimized if not wholly eliminated from courts, but independent commissions are not courts of law.

"Why should not President Eisenhower, or the new President who takes office in 1961, order a searching investigation of the feasibility of reorganizing or abolishing most of the independent commissions? Their present functions could be transferred to appropriate executive departments and to one or more central administrative courts of broad jurisdiction. . . .

"Only along some such lines can we end the evils of the present system and restore some measure of political leadership and responsibility to this headless fourth branch of government." ("A Case for Scuttling Regulatory Agencies," Washington Post, May 1, 1960)

Peter H. Odegard

GOVERNMENT BY CONDITION

A private business may offer employment, goods, or services subject to almost any condition that is not forbidden by law. But is it legitimate for a Federal agency to deny welfare benefits to members of certain political groups, or refuse to purchase from manufacturers who discriminate on the basis of race or religion? May a state university reject students who refuse to bear arms, or may a licensing bureau require applicants to sign away the right to a hearing? May city authorities limit access to streets or parks to restrict public speaking? According to a "note" by student editors of the Harvard Law Review the basis of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" has never been adequately formulated.

Harvard Law Review

"The rapid rise in the number of government regulatory and welfare programs, coupled with the multiplication of government contracts... [affords] the government countless new opportunities to bargain for the surrender of constitutional rights. The potential erosion of fundamental liberties through the use of this bargaining technique has prompted the development of the doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions.'"

The most significant ground for invalidating a condition has been its "irrelevancy to the attainment of the governmental objectives involved in the extension of the benefit." But courts and commentators have failed so far to refute the argument that has long appealed to legislators: if the government may withhold a benefit without giving a reason, it may withhold or revoke it because of an individual's refusal to surrender his constitutional rights. As a corollary, the recipient is not deprived of a right since he is free to reject the benefit.

Careful examination of this superficially compelling logic reveals two fallacies. "First, the power to impose conditions is not a lesser part of the greater power to withhold, but instead is a distinct exercise of power which must find its own justification. . . . Second, the power to withhold or revoke is not arbitrary. . . . In any case where the government confers advantages on some, it must justify their denial to others by reference to a constitutionally recognized reason."

In the area of regulation, the government may withhold licenses, issue them with conditions, and revoke them. These alternative instruments for controlling conduct are valid only when they serve to protect those social interests and achieve those objectives which justify the exercise of the regulatory power.

Welfare benefits may be withheld altogether, with no justification. But granting them subject to conditions "is either an assertion of the power to govern the lives of beneficiaries" or dual-purpose use of the spending power which, constitutionally, must be justifiably related to the purpose of the expenditure. To require a beneficiary to refrain from exercising a constitutional right is to make exercise of the right tantamount to a crime.

It is dangerous to look upon government in the role of a contractor as comparable to a private individual. Individuals may deal with whom they choose, on conditions of their choice. But government may contract for goods and services solely to attain constitutional objectives. Conditions are legitimate only when "necessary to secure the legitimate objectives of the contract, ensure its effective use, or protect society from the potential harm which may result from the contractual relationship." ("Unconstitutional Conditions," *Harvard Law Review*, June 1960)

Equal protection

FEDERAL TAXING FOR LOCAL SPENDING

The Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania proposes a new approach to federalism, with more taxes raised nationally even if the spending is handled locally.

Senator Joseph S. Clark State and local governments have tripled both their revenues and their indebtedness since 1946, while Federal revenues have risen 74 per cent and debt 5 per cent. Many units of local government have already reached the practical limit of their tax resources. Others will reach it long before they can, unaided, meet public needs.

The property tax, which still supplies seven-eighths of local revenues, "was perhaps well suited to colonial America when almost all wealth was in real property and most income came from the land.... Today only a fraction of total wealth is represented by equities in real property. A poor man or a middle-class suburbanite, it is true, may have all his accumulated wealth in his mortgaged home.... While the rich man pays local property taxes on what may be a tiny fraction of his accumulated wealth, the average-income man pays on what may be two to ten or more times his accumulated wealth. As it affects individuals, a more inequitable tax system could hardly be devised. And because the property tax is thus inversely related to ability to pay, its limit is reached early."

The only other major local revenue sources are the wage tax, which is levied upon the entire income of the wage earner, and the sales tax, which is not only regressive but also "ill-suited for local application because of competition between city and suburban merchants."

Every state by now has recognized the limits of local taxation and is providing state money for the provision of local services. In some states, more than half the state budget consists of local grants. Yet over half of all state tax revenue comes from sales and excise taxes, which are regressive.

"The competition among states to get and keep industry within their boundaries is so keen . . . that no state dares shift the burden to progressive taxes. . . . I personally doubt that industry would flee wholesale from a state that raised its business or individual income taxes, but it can certainly threaten to—and ordinarily the threat suffices. Certainly the chance of getting new industry is adversely affected if a state develops the reputation of having an adverse 'business climate.' So state governments, like local governments, are putting greater and greater loads upon limited, regressive, and inequitable tax structures.

"The Federal tax system, by contrast, is well adapted to a modern industrial economy. Its corporate and individual income taxes seek out the main earning streams of the economy, wherever they happen to be located. General Motors could conceivably flee from Michigan . . . but it cannot flee the United States. . . . And the Federal tax system makes no distinction between income invested in property" and the stocks, bonds, and other intangibles which represent most of the country's wealth.

It follows automatically, then, that the Federal tax system should be used to an increasing degree to finance state and local services.

Where decision-making can best be made at the local level and national uniformity is not essential, administration of programs should, "to the maximum extent, remain local. . . . The essential point in constructing our new federalism . . . is to look separately at taxing and spending. . . . The Swiss system, whereby all taxes are, I believe, collected centrally and

Competition among states The "usurped" taxes argument

Not the same

taxpayers

Tax Foundation

then shared among all levels of government, deserves our careful study."

Is there no alternative? "Cannot Federal tax sources be relinquished to the states to permit them to finance the functions themselves? As a former mayor [of Philadelphia], I can testify that the organized mayors and the organized governors never ask for Federal aid until they have first demanded that the Federal Government 'return' tax sources which it has 'usurped' so that the states can take care of themselves." The utter failure of recent efforts by the Joint Federal-State Action Committee created for this express purpose "should be enough to persuade discerning people that it can't be done."

Federally financed, locally administered projects are not new. But they are not openly acknowledged. "Thus, we disguised our 1958 education act as the *National Defense* Education Act. Similarly, when the Federal Government took over a 90 per cent share of the cost of our major highways, it was also in the guise of national defense—even though the Defense Department just now found out that the bridges on the new highways will not clear its military vehicles. . . . The airport act, the stream pollution control act, the Hill-Burton hospital construction act, the urban renewal act, all carry time limits, on the theory that thus no permanent damage is being done to our traditional concept of federalism.

"Any one of you who could spend a day going through a senator's incoming mail would be surprised at the incessant repetition of the states' rights cliches . . . demands that the Federal Government stay out of education, housing, or what have you, and let the states and cities take care of themselves. . . .

"Don't these people . . . understand the stringent limits on state and local taxes and the great superiority of the Federal tax system?

"The answer is: of course they do.... That is what all the shouting is about." Under Federal aid programs some states get back more than they pay out and some get less, but the real point is "that it is not the same taxpayers.... The brunt of Federal taxation falls upon the corporations and the upper-income families. State and local taxes fall far more heavily upon the average-and-lower-income families.... Federal aid redistributes the wealth downward. A shift of responsibility to the states would redistribute the wealth upward. It is that simple." ("Toward National Federalism," Address, George Washington University, Washington, D. C., March 28, 1960)

The trustees of Tax Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, are for the most part executives of large corporations and banks. George Bishop, senior researcher, headed a study of tax payments by income classes based on 1958 tax receipts and Government estimates of national and personal income and expenditures for that year.

"The study is designed mainly to show whether the tax burden is progressively or regressively distributed. "In this context, progression means that the estimated tax burden is a higher percentage of the income of high-income families than of low-income families. . . .

"The percentages indicate that the total tax burden excluding social insurance is almost exactly proportional to income up to the income level of at least \$15,000. The differences as between the income classes under \$15,000 are too small to be significant in view of the nature of these estimates. The total tax burden including social insurance drops off rather noticeably . . . [reflecting] the regressive distribution of social insurance taxes. . . .

"The total Federal tax burden, reflecting the importance of the individual and corporation income taxes, shows a rather progressive distribution . . . [rising] from 9.6 per cent for families with incomes under \$2,000 to 28.6 per cent for families with incomes of \$15,000 and over.

"On the other hand, the total state and local tax burden falls from 11.3 per cent for families with incomes under \$2,000 to 5.9 per cent for families with incomes of \$15,000 and over. . . . The major part of these taxes is accounted for by excise and sales taxes and by property taxes. . . .

"While there has been some relative shift in the total tax system toward these more regressive elements [since 1946], the total tax system remains approximately proportional to income for the vast majority of the population." ("Allocation of the Tax Burden by Income Class," Project Note 45, May 1960)

BIRTH CONTROL AND PUBLIC POLICY

Two documents by Catholic laymen indicate a possible easing of traditional Catholic political pressures in the area of public policy-making on birth control.

Dr. St. John-Stevas, an English lawyer, has recently completed a study of morals and law, under a fellowship of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Norman St. John-Stevas "A strong case exists for the abandonment of Catholic efforts to secure a total legislative ban on contraceptives." Such laws are unenforceable and ineffective. In campaigning for them, Catholics "gain little for public morality" while increasing "the fear of Catholicism in the minds of non-Catholics."

Catholics, however, should advocate U. S. Government neutrality on the issue of using foreign aid to implement artificial birth control programs. And Catholics should "legitimately and prudently" oppose laws which in any way commit the state to approve or advocate birth control.

"Efforts to preserve public morality would be more constructive if confined to measures commanding general support, such as the banning of the sales of contraceptives from slot machines or the restriction of sales to adults." ("Birth Control and Public Policy," Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960)

Dr. Kerwin is professor of political science at the University of Chicago and writes under the imprimatur of Francis Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New York.

Jerome G. Kerwin

Birth control is "a question which, say, ten years from now may not figure at all if an acceptable natural means of limiting the number of children for proper cause is found. . . . The complaint at the present time is that Catholics seek to impose their views on this question upon an unwilling public. . . . Whatever might be said for the Catholic voters in Massachusetts and Connecticut, it is questionable if a right that is undoubtedly theirs has been used with practical wisdom. Pressure politics both for good and for ill has become a part of our democratic process, but high pressure from a religious source does not go down well with the American public. . . .

"If the law permits in most states the giving of information on birth control, I can see no other way for Catholics than the toleration of giving such information in public institutions." (Catholic Viewpoint on Church and State)

THE INVASION OF SPACE

THE FRONTIER PROBLEMS FOR GOVERNMENT

A New York Times staff writer reports from Washington:

John W. Finney

"The swift pace toward practical exploitation of space is forcing a reappraisal of the Government's role in developing and controlling the use of space.

"Officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have recently realized that the pace of space developments is outstripping Government plans, organization and concepts.

"The space agency, which had tended to view itself as primarily a scientific-engineering group, now finds itself plunged, without preparation, into such broad public policy questions as subsidies, licensing regulation and private vs. public development of space activities. . . ."

The agency is now making studies "to determine the economic potentials for commercial exploitation of space and define the proper relationship between Government and industry in utilization of space, and to determine the proper organization within the Government to coordinate and control practical uses in space. . . ."

The reappraisal was prompted by the American Telephone & Telegraph Company's appearance "before the Federal Communications Commission . . . with its plan to use a network of fifty satellites to establish telephone and television circuits throughout the world and to urge that a broad part of the radio spectrum above 1,000 megacycles to be set aside for such communication satellites. . . .

"Space agency officials point out that the communications proposal, which has acted as the particular catalyst for the reappraisal studies now under way, raises such difficult questions of public policy as these:

"Should private industry exploit space, which is international in nature, or should this role be assumed by the Government, which would make the use of its satellites available to private concerns?

"To what extent should the Federal Government subsidize the private development of space, either through research and development assistance or through supplying launching vehicles?

"What is to be the role of the Government in regulating private space launchings and licensing the use of space vehicles?

"Should the Government permit one or two companies to gain a favored or monopolistic position in the commercial utilization of space?"

Officials also suggest the need for some inter-agency organization to coordinate and plan the uses of space.

"By their nature, communications satellites are international in scope and their development and advent involve a myriad of agencies such as the space agency, the State and Defense Departments, and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. . . . At present there exists no formal machinery to coordinate the views of the various Government agencies and establish official policy." (The New York Times, July 25, 1960)

The policy questions

CAN WE COMMUNICATE WITH THE STARS?

The National Radio Astronomy Observatory in West Virginia is probing the stars nearest the solar system for signs of intelligent messages from them (Current, May 1960, p. 41). Professor Bracewell, an Australian radio astronomer now at the Radioscience Laboratory of Stanford University, suggests that a satellite sent by an advanced civilization in the galaxy may now be in orbit around the sun.

Ronald Newbold Bracewell

"Of the thousands of millions of planets in the galaxy likely to be situated similarly to the Earth in relation to their star, it is hard to dismiss the possibility that some have more advanced civilizations than ours. In view of the acceleration with which technology develops, advanced societies could be incredibly more advanced.

"Any simple test of this possibility would be well worth while." One astronomer plans to look at two neighboring stars, τ Ceti and ϵ Eridani, which seem, along with ϵ Indi, the most likely as a source of intelligent messages.

"But do we really expect a superior community to be on the nearest of those stars which we cannot at the moment positively rule out? Unless superior communities are extremely abundant, is it not more likely that the nearest is situated at least ten times farther off, say, beyond 100 light years? Let us assume that there are one thousand likely stars within the same range as the nearest superior community. This makes it hard for us to select the right one. Furthermore, if this advanced society is looking for us, we can only expect to find them expending such effort as they could afford to expend on the thousand likely stars within the same range of them. It does not seem likely that they would maintain a thousand transmitters at powers well above the megawatt . . . estimated as a minimum for spanning only ten light years, and run them for many years, and we could scarcely count on them paying special attention to us. Remember that throughout most of the thousands of millions of years of the Earth's existence such attention would have been fruitless.

"Would not this other more advanced society, on the contrary, be doing what we ourselves are now discussing and are on the point of doing, probably during this century, namely, sending probes to nearby stars? Their exploration and other activity would be intense in their immediately neighboring planetary systems. Beyond their immediate neighborhood, it might be feasible for them to spray some number of suitable stars, say, one thousand, with modest probes. Each probe would be sent into a circular orbit about one of the thousand stars, at a distance within the habitable zone of temperature. Armored against meteorites and radiation damage, and stellar powered, the probes could contain durable radio transmitters for the purpose of attracting the attention of technologies such as ours.

"Using this plan, our hypothetical advanced neighbors could lay down a stronger signal here than they could with a home-based transmitter handicapped by . . . interstellar distances. They would also eliminate their dependence on our ingenuity in selecting the right star and the right wave-length.

"For this reason we might better devote our efforts to scrutinizing our solar system for signs of probes sent here by our more advanced neighbors. In this way we would be effectively paying attention to all stars capable of reaching us. We need not expect, however, that any community other

Other probes from other societies How to make contact

Communication

no problem

than the nearest is trying to reach us, because the superior communities throughout the galaxy are probably already linked together into an existing galaxy-wide chain of communication. They will act in concert and avoid duplication in searching. Our impending contact cannot be expected to be the first of its kind; rather it will be our induction into the chain of superior communities, who have had long experience in effecting contacts with emerging communities like ours.

"For suggestions as to how the superior communities may detect us, consider what we might do to detect them. A very good first project for us, when we come to probe outside the solar system, would be to seek the presence of technological development on τ Ceti and ε Eridani by means of a probe that would listen for the existence of monochromatic radio-communication, and report back by star-to-star relay. We would see whether there is in those solar systems a radio-frequency line emission spectrum such as the Earth now emits. It is possible, in faet, that the hypothetical feelers sent out in large numbers by our nearest superior community did no more than listen for this radiation. If so, a positive answer could have been on the way back to the home star several decades ago, and we may look forward in due course to the arrival of a more sophisticated mission.

"However, since interstellar transfer of material things is time-consuming, and transfer of information is in any event more important, it would be commensurate with the effort of delivering a material probe into our solar system if the very first probe sent here contained a quite elaborate store of information and a complex computer, so that it could not only detect our presence, but could also converse with us. Such a probe may be here now, in our solar system, trying to make its presence known to us. For this purpose a radio transmitter would seem essential. On what wave-length would it transmit, and how should we decode its signal? To ensure use of a wave-length that could both penetrate our ionosphere and be in a band certain to be in use, the probe could first listen for our signals and then repeat them back. To us, its signals would have the appearance of echoes having delays of seconds or minutes, such as were reported thirty years ago . . . and never explained.

"To notify the probe that we had heard it, we would repeat back to it once again. It would then know that it was in touch with us. After some routine tests to guard against accident, and to test our sensitivity and band-width, it would begin its message, with further occasional interrogation to ensure that it had not set below our horizon. Should we be surprised if the beginning of its message were a television image of a constellation?

"These details, and the matter of teaching the probe our language (by transmitting a pictorial dictionary?), are fascinating but present no problems once contact has been made with the probe. The latter is the main problem. The important thing for us is to be alert to the possible interstellar origin of unexpected signals. We must avoid relegating them, if they are there, to the fate of the very strong emissions from Jupiter (of the order of 1,000 megawatts per Mc./s.) which were heard and ignored for decades.

"If after a few years of careful attention we find no signs, radio or other, of such probe, we shall have to admit the possibility that our nearest superior community is beyond the range where attempts at contact with us would be assured of much certainty of success." ("Communications from Superior Galactic Communities," Nature, May 28, 1960)

REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM

CUBA, COMMUNISM AND HEMISPHERIC UNITY

Mr. Benton, a former Senator and Assistant Secretary of State, voices a warning based on information gathered during a twelve-nation trip around Latin America in the company of Adlai Stevenson.

William Benton

"One economist who has spent a lifetime studying South America predicts that, if anti-Yankee sentiment continues to grow at the present rate, within five years all pro-American political leaders will be regarded as contemptuously as the people of France considered collaborators with the Nazis during and after World War II.

"Few Latin-American leaders seem to fear that the Communists, as such, can take over control of any key Latin government in the near future....

Nonetheless we face the present danger—and it is a real one—that Moscow and Peiping may succeed in ... weakening the hemisphere system by alienating substantial segments of it from the United States....

"A new press service, 'Prensa Latina,' has been formed by the Castro regime to distribute 'news' stories throughout Latin America. The anti-American bias of this new agency echoes that of the Communist newspapers. Further, Castro is now building a powerful radio transmitter to drench Latin America with his propaganda....

"One of our ambassadors estimated that in 1959 alone the Russians spent nearly a million dollars just for airplane tickets to transport Latin American students abroad. Red China is active with a similar program. . . .

"While most of the government leaders in Latin America are certain that the Castro regime is infiltrated and greatly influenced by Communists, the majority do not believe that he is himself one. The Cuban Premier's conduct after his revolution—especially his executions, his censorship, and his reckless tirades against the U.S.—have disenchanted Latin political and governmental leaders....

"But Castro is still enormously influential with students, intellectuals and the working classes throughout Latin America. For large numbers, he is still the stalwart David who challenged the U.S. Goliath. For them, who have known corruption in their own countries, he stands as a symbol of honesty among would-be grabbers of public funds. For them, his program of land-reform—designed for more effective use of agricultural areas and for the benefit of the people who live and work them—has enormous appeal. . . .

"Raul Castro is now promoting what he labels a 'third force' in the Latin-American labor movement. He is in effect fronting for the Communist attempt to form a Moscow-dominated labor federation in direct competition with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. . . .

"Propaganda is also spread through the hemisphere by the new crop of youthful hotheads who form the Cuban diplomatic corps.... New Cuban ambassadors are only 26 or 27 years old. The ambassador to Argentina is 30. Only three Latin-American countries maintain direct relations with the USSR. But a Cuban envoy is at home in the Latin-American cultural setting and can enjoy a greater intimacy with the local scene than any Russian

Castro's propaganda

And his influence

ambassador is likely to achieve. These youthful ambassadors are organizing groups called 'Friends of Cuba' which will help spread anti-American propaganda." ("The Communist Threat at Our Back Door," *The New York Times Magazine*, July 17, 1960)

A former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Brazil paints a still darker picture.

A. A. Berle, Jr.

"For all practical purposes, Cuba is as much a Communist satellite as Hungary or North Korea. I mean that a few Communists, or men controlled by them, whose policy and tactics are directed either by Moscow or Peiping (probably the latter...) are in control of Cuba's resources, its territory and its voiceless people. . . .

"The clique dominating Cuba intends direct aggression against the rest of Latin America with Chinese and Soviet support. . . . The Castro Government captured large reserves of U.S.-made weapons from the fallen Batista Government. They were more than enough for any Cuban needs. Promptly, nevertheless, the Cuban revolutionary Government began to import arms. . . . All this armament is obviously not intended for display in museums. The information available adds up to the creation of an arsenal of insurrection in Cuba, a supply depot capable of delivering equipment and munitions to points on the littoral of the Caribbean, a great crescent running from Venezuela through Central America to Guatemala and Mexico's Yucatan peninsula. . . .

"There is not the slightest doubt that the objective is not to bring about social revolution throughout Latin America but to strike at the United States. The slogans chalked on the walls near each activist center in this entire region reveal the insurrectionists' true motives eloquently: 'Cuba, si-Yanqui, no,' 'Down with Yanqui imperialism,' are the most common. Local governments are attacked as 'stooges of Uncle Sam.' . . .

"President Dorticos, titular head of the Cuban State, whose sympathies are certainly Communist, has just completed a series of visits through South America. . . . In all cases, Dorticos endeavored not merely to stir up sentiment against the United States but to organize a crusade, which incidentally was to be a crusade against the local governments as well. . . .

"There is ample reason to believe that agreement can now be reached on common action to maintain regional peace. An immediate system of control of traffic in arms ought to be set up, preferably by the Organization of American States. . . . No vessels or planes carrying arms should be allowed in the area without a permit from the arms-control authority. . . . The United States and any Latin-American countries that care to join (I believe most would do so) should be prepared to oppose by all necessary means any movements or governments that are manipulated overtly or covertly by forces outside the hemisphere. . . .

"Naturally a sharp distinction should be made between Communist aggression and the political and economic changes that are obviously necessary in much of Latin America. But the best friends of democratic progress in the hemisphere must always be implacable enemies of camouflaged foreign aggression.

"Implementing this determination, a thoroughgoing Latin-American Marshall Plan agreement for the economic rehabilitation of the areas involved ought to be formulated at once. . . . The necessity we face now is not only to maintain public order but also to meet social and economic problems with energy, common sense, and generosity." ("The Communist Invasion of Latin America," *The Reporter*, July 7, 1960)

Castro's guns

And their purpose

THE SOVIET POWER STRUGGLE

The aborted Summit session set off much speculation about Khrushchev's position and the locus of power in the Kremlin. It centered on a possible decline in Khrushchev's authority, the role of a "hard" faction in Moscow, and the influence of China on Soviet policies.

MECHANICAL VERSUS MORAL POWER

Soviet affairs analyst Richard Lowenthal concludes that Khrushchev is firmly in control and that the struggle, such as it is, involves his subordinates and the degree of their influence upon him. A former correspondent for The Observer, Mr. Lowenthal is currently at Harvard's Russian Research Center working on a major study of totalitarianism.

"Any regime that wishes to mold society in a predetermined pattern into which it would not grow of its own accord—and that is the essence of both Leninism and Stalinism—must insist on the totalitarian principle of concentrating all power and initiative at a single point.

"Soviet practice has consistently corresponded to this principle—in the last years of Lenin, during most of Stalin's reign, and also under Khrush-chev—except in the two crises of succession. . . .

"In both succession crises the head of the party Secretariat—that is, the head of the executive machinery of the organization which embodies legitimate authority in the single-party state-emerged victorious. The reason for both victories is simple: as head of the Secretariat, Khrushchev is favored not only by the prestige of his office, but more importantly by the fact that the Secretariat is charged with preparing the meetings of the Presidium and presenting the facts to its members, with executing its decisions, and above all with the powers of appointment and publicity. Within the Secretariat, an executive organ, no voting takes place; there is only subordination and division of labor; he who dominates it is in a position-by virtue of his control of the press and radio-to influence the outcome of any factional struggle, to appoint regional and republican secretaries who will pack the next party congress with his supporters, and to arrange the composition of the next Central Committee according to his wishes. But once he has won the succession struggle and, by the aid of these organizational techniques, has emerged publicly as the new and acclaimed political leader, his power has become more vast and secure. . . .

"[The] record of Khrushchev's unremitting consolidation of power seems quite incompatible with the assumption that his leadership could still be seriously challenged at the present stage by any 'neo-Stalinist' or 'pro-Chinese' faction. Such a faction would have to start with an incomparably weaker base than the 'anti-party group' which Khrushchev defeated in 1957—without control of any one of the great power machines, without the nationwide prestige of any of the old leaders, and with the whole accumulated force of the 'Khrushchev cult' against it. In fact, assumptions about the formation of such a faction and its success in gaining a majority simply reflect a failure to distinguish between the conditions of

Richard Lowenthal

Limitations on Khrushchev's power

Khrushchev is not infallible

an unresolved succession crisis, in which such developments may and indeed have occurred, and the conditions of firmly re-established one-manleadership, which is the normal rule of life in the one-party state.

"Yet if we make the opposite assumption—namely, that Khrushchev is the unchallenged successor of Lenin and Stalin as head of the party and state—it does not follow that his power is subject to no limitations whatsoever. If he is not in danger of being overthrown or put under tutelage by a majority of the Presidium, he still has to take account of the weight of social forces and the movement of opinion in the leading strata of society upon which his power is based.

"It is by now a commonplace that any attempt to run the Soviet Union at its present stage of economic development by the methods of mass terrorism, an army of labor slaves, and so on, would be vastly more irrational than it was when Stalin first introduced these methods, and that Khrushchev is fully aware of this. But any regime that does not wish, or is unable, to achieve its aim by methods of mass terrorism has to take some account of the needs and desires of all the forces whose cooperation it requires. This is not necessarily-and in the Soviet Union is not normally-a matter of conscious political pressure. The Soviet Government grants wage increases not chiefly because it has reason to fear that the workers might go on strike, but because it wants to give them an incentive to work harder. . . . In just the same way, it must take into account the discontent in the officer corps, not because the high command sends ultimatums to Khrushchev or concludes an alliance with the alleged 'neo-Stalinists' in the Presidium, but simply because the existence of high morale in the armed forces is of utmost concern to the regime. . . .

"There may indeed be more direct limitations on Khrushchev's power. It is worth recalling that in the early days of the Soviet regime even Lenin occasionally found himself in the minority . . . and chose temporarily to bow to the majority. . . . Such temporary concessions to majorities, which express not a systematic opposition to the leader but a temporary climate of opinion in the leading party organs, are the inevitable price for maintaining the fiction of 'democratic centralism,' or in more realistic terms, for wishing to maintain a genuine exchange of opinions within the leading circle: when Stalin decided to do away with such concessions in principle, he also ended both the possibility of such discussion and the 'democratic' fiction—and he became an undisguised despot, except in the eyes of some naïve outsiders.

"Khrushchev, having restored the climate of top-level discussion among his supporters, must thus be prepared to be put into a minority occasionally—at least in matters of detail. For though he has prompted a 'personality' cult at once vaster and more servile than Lenin would have tolerated, his real authority—as distinct from his power—is nevertheless still far inferior to that of the founder of the Soviet state, or for that matter, to that of the man who led Russia through the bitter years of forced collectivization and World War II. In short, Khrushchev disposes of all the levers of command, but he is not yet regarded as infallible within the inner circle.

"This distinction between what may be termed mechanical power and moral authority is, in this author's opinion, as crucial to an understanding of the present stage in the evolution of the Soviet regime as the previous distinction drawn between the direct political pressures of social forces and their indirectly felt weight. One aspect of the present situation is Khrushchev's lack of historical achievement; ergo, his hunt for spectacular prestige successes abroad, or his proneness to a quick sequence of extrava-

Khrushchev is beyond challenge

To understand the Soviets

gant promises at home. If he fails to make good on any particular promise, whether in regard to overtaking the U.S. in meat consumption per head or to running the Western powers out of Berlin, he is not yet strong enough simply to drop the subject 'down the memory hole,' or to silence criticism by liquidating the critics. He is compelled instead to initiate a new and equally exciting venture, thus diverting attention from his previous failures.

"Khrushchev is strong enough, however, to be beyond a serious challenge to his position. There is all the difference in the world between the hypothesis of an angry, disappointed mood in the Soviet leadership following the decline of prospects for a summit victory on Berlin, the U-2 incident, and President Eisenhower's assumption of responsibility for it-a mood to which Khrushchev would have had to pay attention in handling the situation-and the hypothesis of a hostile faction using that mood to send the leader who for years has acted as exclusive and plenipotentiary Soviet spokesman on world affairs to a crucial negotiation with detailed 'instructions' removing his freedom of action, or having the power to reverse such instructions or to withdraw his negotiating powers after his back was turned. The first hypothesis assumes a common embarrassment of Khrushchev and his team at having been made to look foolish in their dispute with the Chinese Communists; the second assumes a majority of his team turning on him to tell him that the Chinese had been right and he had better admit it and adopt their policy. Both hypotheses might explain some aspects of Khrushchev's behavior during the critical days, but the first is compatible with what we know of the power situation in Russia, and the second is not. The latter amounts to assuming a head-on, deliberate challenge to Khrushchev's leadership which could only end either with his downfall or with the purging of his critics. . . .

"There is not a shred of real evidence to indicate a challenge on this scale. The record of recent events, and indeed of recent years, shows many illustrations of Khrushchev's eagerness to solidify his domestic authority and popularity by quick adjustments to changing situations; it shows none which prove uncertainty in his position. The two things should not be confused....

"If we wish to interpret events as they are unfolding, it is clearly impossible to confine ourselves to documentation which is both official and explicit: none such will be forthcoming until a particular conflict is decided, and even then it most likely will be one-sided as well as fragmentary. This is particularly true insofar as the struggles among the aspirants for the next succession are concerned: there is no doubt that in Stalin's lifetime keen rivalry existed first between Zhdanov and Malenkov, and later between Malenkov and Khrushchev, but even today our knowledge of the issues and turning points is tenuous at best. . . .

"But while there is an extreme dearth of official and explicit documentation, one must be on guard against supplementing it liberally with information based on the private statements made by Soviet officials to Westerners, or even to Poles and Yugoslavs. Most, though of course not all, of these private statements are made for an immediate tactical purpose; while the official documents are studied inside the Soviet Communist Party and Government apparatus, the private statements can be made deliberately for their effect on Western opinion and policy. It follows, therefore, as an elementary rule of thumb, that official Soviet party documents, if read with due regard to the known element of ideological and propagandist distortion, are more trustworthy than almost all of the so-called 'inside information' available to the West.

"This means that if analysts wish to learn more than they are told, they must concentrate their attention above all on official documents, including public speeches, debates, resolutions, appointments, etc., and study them for their hidden implications—as would, indeed, a trained Soviet Communist. . . .

"It is not the purpose of these remarks to discourage speculation on Soviet internal politics, which is inevitable owing to the insufficiency of direct documentation, and in many cases highly legitimate. Rather, the author would like to see some of this speculation directed into more fruitful and promising channels. If Khrushchev's position is reasonably secure, then the struggle for influence over him and for his eventual succession must be in process. . . . These moves do not lend themselves easily to dramatic assumptions about implications for foreign policy, but . . . they may well . . . determine the lineup for the next real power struggle in Russia—the struggle for Khrushchev's eventual succession." ("The Nature of Khrushchev's Power," Problems of Communism, July-August 1960)

THE ROLE OF THE APPARATCHIKS

While agreeing that Khrushchev's position is strong, Robert Conquest a British expert on Russia and author of a forthcoming book (Power and Policy in the Soviet Union)—contends that a real struggle for power and influence is going on in Russia's next-to-the-inner ruling circle.

"There seems good reason to believe that in the last two or three years the fight in the Kremlin has focused on an attempt by Khrushchev to attain complete freedom of action by destroying the last center of power opposed to him—the group of permanent party officials who were his allies against his previous rivals, but who are not his personal appointees and are not willing to serve him blindly.

"References to 'Stalinists' in positions of power have been both vague and unconvincing, particularly in view of the defeat of the main 'Stalinist' enemies in 1957; for if Khrushchev was capable of dealing with giants like Malenkov and Molotov, why would he find it so difficult to remove their less powerful cohorts? If we are to believe that Khrushchev is in fact having great difficulties, we must assume that the common view is wrong, and that he never did succeed in imposing himself completely. There is considerable evidence for this.

"One important aspect of Stalin's attainment of supremacy [was] the fact that he not only had mastered all the other sources of power, but had also reduced the party apparatus itself to a mere appendage of his personal secretariat. Khrushchev, on the other hand, used the party apparatus to destroy the others [Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Zhukov] but he has not yet imposed his personal control on the apparatchiks themselves. From the organizational point of view, therefore, we can identify the major factor in the struggle that has evidently been going on over the past few years as an attempt by Khrushchev himself to impose his own personal following upon the party machine, against the strong and frequently effective resistance by the regular apparatchiks..."

"Khrushchev's position impels him to . . . try to insure his irremovability and the adoption of his policies. This, in turn, is bound to produce resistance from secondary leaders who wish to retain the power to influence policy. It would perhaps not be going too far to see such considerations as the main dynamic of Soviet politics. . . .

Robert Conquest

"All in all, while Khrushchev seems not to have seized full personal power and defeated his opponents, the fact remains that the apparatchiks are not in a position to remove him either. It is possible, therefore, that they will attempt to hold the line, using his talents as far as possible for their own ends. Moreover, there would be no obvious advantage in removing him if, as seems probable, any successor would be prompted by the logic of his position to seek the same supremacy that Khrushchev has been striving for in the past few years. . . .

"By the same token, the dynamics of the situation will obviously impel Khrushchev to make further efforts to gain control. The 22nd Congress, due in 1961, will presumably be empowered to elect a new Central Committee. For this reason, it may well become a critical point in the struggle. But this is true only from the public point of view. In practice whoever controls a decisive majority of the Central Committee, the Presidium, and the Secretariat can control the composition of the Congress, and in any case dictate the resolutions and the list of candidates which go before it.

... The struggle for power [is] the hallmark of Soviet politics." ("The Struggle Goes On," Problems of Communism, July-August 1960)

THE EFFECT OF DOMESTIC DILEMMAS

The author of The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, now associate professor of public law and government at the Russian Institute of Columbia University, examines some domestic Soviet problems and their effect on Russia's foreign conduct.

"Probably the most important domestic dilemma the Soviet leadership faces is the danger inherent in the progressive obliteration of the sharp distinction between the Russian society at large and the ruling Communist Party which had existed throughout the history of the Soviet state. The blurring of the dividing line is the outcome of an entirely new situation in Soviet history in which the ruling Party and the ruled society at long last share the same domestic objective: the attainment of material well-being. This is not to say that in the past the Party had purposely pursued a policy of artificial poverty; it did, however, have other, higher priorities. The promotion of rapid industrialization, the policy of forced collectivization and the efforts to eliminate most forms of private property put the Party in the position of waging war against the society that it was ruling. The conflict between Party and society produced a profound gulf between them, but in turn consolidated the cohesion of the Party and protected its ideological purity and revolutionary zeal. There was no room in the Party for those who merely dreamed of buying a Moskvitch and of traveling abroad, nor for those like Vladimir Dudintsev who engaged in soul-searching musings. Furthermore, the conflict between Party and society strengthened the conviction of the Party that its rule was essential to the fulfillment of its social objectives.

"Today Soviet society has reached a stage of development whereby it could by itself achieve continued progress and through its own efforts seek material well-being. The managerial know-how, the technical skill, the industrial wherewithal are all there, and the revolutionary zeal, the militant discipline, are not necessary if affluence is the goal. It is precisely because the Party is no longer the absolute prerequisite for achieving its own domestic policies that it must seek some other justification for its continued monopoly of power and some other source of revolutionary dedication

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The problem of Soviet affluence

The problem of resource allocation

> The problem of bloc diversity

The need for unity at the top among its membership. The danger of erosion of the Party's authority applies equally within the society at large and within the Party itself, and poses the threat of ideological decay within the ruling elite.

"The second broad dilemma the Party faces is closely related and does not require elaboration. The problem of the allocation of resources immediately raises its head if the Party is at all serious about achieving a significant improvement in the popular standard of living. If the standard of living is to rise, other priorities must be sacrificed, at least partially. One of these involves the military establishment. The need for manpower and the high cost of maintaining a huge land army (increasingly less important in the age of rockets and nuclear weapons) have led Khrushchev to take the drastic step of appreciably cutting the size of the military forces. As a result, the Party has been faced with a crisis of morale among many of the dismissed Army officers and also presumably with the argument that its policy is endangering national security.

"The third general dilemma the Party faces is the problem of greater diversity within the Communist bloc. This diversity has developed since Stalin's death and still persists, in spite of a measure of consolidation over the last two years. As a consequence, the several Communist regimes are more and more able to entertain alternative conceptions of purposes and are even willing to articulate them. On one extreme, there is China, increasingly willing to articulate openly its disagreements with the Soviet Union on the means to be used in pursuit of common aims. For instance, the Chinese leaders in their recent speeches have registered their disagreement with the Soviets on such important matters as: the inevitability of war; the implications of nuclear weapons in the survival of the two competing systems; the proper attitude toward the capitalist world and the neutralist states. At the other end of the bloc is East Germany, quietly but persistingly indicating its uneasiness over the disconcerting presence of the West in its capital city.

"In order to respond effectively to these various pulls and pressures, Soviet leadership must be centralized and purposeful. Soviet leaders are well aware that in the absence of such leadership these dilemmas could give rise to disintegrative splits and divisive disputes within the Soviet Union and the bloc. Unity at the top is particularly important in domestic affairs because of the change in character of the Soviet regime since Stalin's death. Under Stalin, the institutional structure of Soviet totalitarianism was essentially pluralistic: Stalin manipulated the Party, the state adminisration, the Army and the secret police, while societal compliance was assured by the use of terror. Under Khrushchev the Party has risen to unprecedented heights and today the Soviet totalitarian structure is essentially monistic. The Party has assumed preponderance over the other institutions and for this the Party apparatchiki are deeply in debt to Khrushchev personally.

"However, also because of these moves, the Party no longer relies on terror to the same extent as under Stalin, and divisive splits within its top ranks could easily provoke dangerous consequences for its power position. The need for a certain measure of social consensus, therefore, requires a leader who has personal popularity and great skill in handling the levers of power. Khrushchev combines both qualities. His leadership unquestionably enjoys a measure of mass appeal, abetted by an organized campaign to glorify him personally. . . . But Khrushchev's power rests not only on his personal standing with the masses. The recent changes in the Soviet leadership have been designed to eliminate any personal interlocking in the vari-

The erosion of ideological fervor

The need for external successes

> The image of America

ous institutions at the apex of the Soviet political pyramid, leaving Khrushchev alone as the link between such bodies (all of which he heads) as the Party Presidium, the Party Secretariat, the Council of Ministers. . .

"In addition to the consolidation of Khrushchev's personal power, strenuous efforts have been undertaken to revitalize political indoctrination both within the Party and within society at large in order to counteract the gradual erosion of ideological commitment. Insofar as the Army is concerned, the Party leadership has made strenuous efforts to gain popularity by the promotion of younger officers to command posts. One of the rising stars in the Party leadership, Leonid Brezhnev, has been put in charge of Army-Party affairs. At the same time, the emphasis on rockets is meant to compensate for any decline in the . . . military establishment.

"With respect to the bloc, the policy of the Khrushchev leadership can best be described as that of peace with victories, which is meant to satisfy the more extreme demands of the Chinese and the East Germans without, however, interfering with the domestic policies the Khrushchev regime feels it must pursue. Indeed, in many respects, the regime is seeking in the external victories a new rationalization for the continued domestic monopoly of power it has enjoyed over the last four decades. It senses that external successes or spectacular scientific demonstrations can give validity to its domestic power, a validity which is eroding domestically with the gradual obliteration of the sharp differences in purpose between Party and society.

"Confident that the scales of history have already been tipped in favor of communism, Khrushchev believes that the West will eventually adjust to the notion that oncessions have to be made, even if piecemeal at first,

and that war can the refore be avoided. . . .

"For the time being Khrushchev can postpone the Berlin crisis, since no alternative is open short of a major international collision. For the time being he can rely on greater domestic indoctrination made easier by aggrieved hostility toward the United States. For the time being he can attack Eisenhower, thereby clearing himself of the charge made by the Chinese, and perhaps echoed at home, that he had allowed himself to be misled by the U.S. President. But there is no evidence that he has either bowed to the Chinese or to anyone else on such crucial issues as Berlin, war, coexistence and, indeed, even on the nature of present American intentions.

"To deal with the latter Khrushchev has invented an explanation for American behavior which is intellectually as subtle and factually as correct as the Western accounts which see the Soviet leader acting as the little puppet of a stony-faced Soviet marshal (one of the amusing ironies is that Khrushchev brought Malinovsky to Paris to intimidate the West. Instead of being intimidated, the West concluded Malinovsky was there to intimidate Khrushchev!), or as the tool of a combined Chinese-Stalinist cabal. According to Khrushchev, there is a war-mongering clique in the United States, supported by the military and some other influential groups, dedicated to the subversion of better relations with the USSR and independently engaging in diversionary activities. As in the Western case, such an account is useful in warding off criticism of policies based on mistaken assumptions concerning the other side (which seems to be the case with both Moscow and Washington) and still allows a certain room for

"In the long run, what makes Khrushchev's dilemmas all the more difficult is that he cannot afford excessive pacificism without running the risk of undermining the sources of his internal power, without running the

The loss of revolutionary momentum risk of allowing the transformation of the Party from a militant type of organization into a Communist version of a chamber of commerce.

"A peaceful, prosperous Soviet Union does not need a disciplined, militant Communist Party. Since the domestic requirements of a relatively mature Soviet society, even as perceived by the Party itself, no longer seem to require continued rule by a militant minority, it is on the external plane that an alert and dedicated Communist leader must seek substitutes for the domestic loss of revolutionary momentum. A domestic return to 'Stalinism' would be no salvation, for it would have to be accompanied by a renewed reliance on terror and secret police violence which would immediately threaten the newly won monistic position of the Party.

"In brief, there is no alternative except to pursue what Khrushchev has been trying to pursue over the last several years: peace with victories. Bluffing, brinkmanship, threats, crises and then relaxations, summits and visits—this is the inevitable pattern. Having too little to gain by the policy of war advocated by the Chinese, and too much to lose by a policy of real peace with the West, the Party has little choice but to follow Khrushchev's daring policy of a delicate balance of terror between peace and war." ("Domestic Dilemmas and Foreign Policy," The New Leader, June 27, 1960)

THE CULTURAL IMPACT OF THE SATELLITES

A correspondent in Europe for The Observer, George Sherman recently visited Poland and Russia.

George Sherman

"Early in 1958 when the Poles wakened to the fact that Mao Tse-tung had fallen from the 'side of the angels'—that he was no longer the 'liberal' who had backed them against the Kremlin in 1956—a new bit of humor made the rounds in Warsaw: 'Aren't we lucky to have such a large buffer state between China and us?'

"The joke may be stale, but after five months in the Soviet Union, I found it sustained by more than Polish wit. Growing numbers of the younger Soviet intelligentsia recognize the uncomfortable truth. Theirs is the heartland of communism, but of a communism whose Eastern and Western faces look less alike each year. . . .

"The 'East'—i.e., China—is causing the most anxiety. Soviet and Chinese moods seem to be running in opposite directions. The Russians crave nothing so much as peace and quiet, while the Chinese seem intent on upsetting the applecart of 'peaceful coexistence.' The Russians live better, relax more; the Chinese—poorer but more diligent—blaze with that revolutionary flame slowly being extinguished in the Soviet Union.

"All that is irritating enough, but there is more. The Russians are intensely nationalistic. They easily imagine the potential challenge to their own 'socialist leadership' posed by the awakened Asian colossus. Nagging fears came out in many small ways; for instance, the half-serious joke about how disobedient children and lazy students are now admonished: 'If you do not do your work, 600 million Chinese will!'

"This anxiety is having extraordinary repercussions in Soviet attitudes towards the 'socialist West'—i.e., Eastern Europe. It is contributing, I think, to a wholesale reappraisal of the satellites. The change is subtle, psychological, but quite real. It is profoundly affecting Soviet social development, for the more antagonism the Russians feel towards the Chinese, the more they strive to emphasize the genuine community of interest with 'their' Europe.

A Communist Commonwealth

With pipelines to Western Europe "The new feeling of equality is more cultural than political. Soviet Communists are still the acknowledged tutors; satellite Communist parties—the willing pupils. But Soviet industrialized society is in search of refinement, the manners and sophistication to go with improved living standards. Educated Russians, the heirs of that society, are turning to the traditional cultures of Eastern Europe for some of the clues, and the Khrushchev policy has paved the way. In Stalin's time Eastern Europe was simply an appendage of the Soviet Empire. The Russian might as well look into a cracked looking-glass; he saw nothing but an ugly distorted image of himself and his surroundings. That has changed. Out of necessity as much as calculation, Mr. Khrushchev has transformed empire into Communist Commonwealth.

"That means Communists still rule each country according to Soviet orthodoxy. It excludes both democracy and an independent foreign policy. But each Party leadership can apply the common principles in its own way. Moscow no longer dictates uniform internal policies. Gomulka's flexible dictatorship in Poland coexists with Ulbricht's rigid Stalinism in East Germany. Eastern Europe has once more taken on that national and cultural variety Stalin's monolith sought to destroy.

"The change has created a new situation. Here are respectable members of the 'socialist camp,' yet many of their ways remain strangely Western. Their intelligentsia has used the post-Stalin 'thaw' to resurrect common cultural ties with Western Europe where possible. The Russians never had these ties. They are the pupils in this realm, and they are discovering that these Eastern European allies are 'safe' channels for importing suspect Western ideas and habits into the Soviet Union. . . .

"Poland and Czechoslovakia seem to have the greatest influence in this new cultural penetration. The Poles are the most provocative, the most avant garde, the most openly Western. . . . [They] seem determined to shock the Russians out of their old conventions. . . .

"The impact of Czechoslovakia is less spectacular than Poland, but perhaps more important. Czechoslovakia is the only reliable ally, the quietly efficient ally, the one ally—in fact, the only country—industrially developed before the Communists took power. The Russians respect them. These 'Germans of the Slavs' have just the right mixture of technical talent, material well-being, and political respectability to appeal to the Soviet nouveau riche. They have both Industrialization and Culture. . . ."

Those Eastern European imports—a Hungarian fashion show complete with elegant models and "rock-'n'-roll" orchestra, a Czechoslovak glass exhibit, etc.—"may seem paltry compared to the obvious political stagnation of the whole Communist orbit. They certainly are not the dramatic stuff of front-page headlines. On the other hand, these imports strike at the heart of that society which has bred the stagnation. They affect the habits and thought of everyday life. When those habits and thought change, political habits and thought must eventually follow suit. At least, that is the hope.

"The Soviet Communists well realize the danger. A press campaign against the 'Trojan horse of peaceful coexistence' is in full swing, that is, against 'bourgeois values' which weaken pure Communist resolve now that Cold War barriers against the West are coming down. But that 'Trojan horse' is creeping into the Soviet Union through their own Eastern European front yard. It is tolerated by some, embraced by others, because few Russians are certain any longer where the Chinese dragon in the backyard is heading." ("Trojan Horse, Chinese Dragon," Encounter, June 1960)

EMERGING AFRICA

THE PROBLEMS OF VIABILITY

After a tour of Africa, William H. Hessler of the Cincinnati Enquirer reports on the problems that come with freedom.

William H. Hessler

"The dismaying thing about the new free Africa that is coming into being with inexorable speed [is that] there is so far to go. The Africans' sights are set high, yet their productivity is low. They want everything at once. They want to skip whole centuries, and plunge in one confident leap from tribalism into a mature technology. There are no Bantu Chandis, enamored of handicrafts and cottage industries. The leaders' eyes are fixed on hydroelectric power and steel mills.

"There is abundant talk of freedom, of course. *Uhuru* is the one Swahili word known in every corner of Africa. And it does mean 'freedom.' But the typical African's notion of *uhuru* has little or nothing to do with democratic self-government, or civil rights, or citizens' obligations—and certainly nothing to do with such distasteful things as taxes. For him, independence means catching up with the living standards of the white Western world—at once. Native leaders who know better—and some do—are too preoccupied with *uhuru* and its attainment to bother with telling uneducated followers about the long uphill road which lies ahead of them.

"Freedom may be the end of nationalist struggle. But it is only the beginning of a formidable agenda of new problems, dimly seen, if at all, by the rank and file—and by most of their leaders.

"The greatest and most urgent task is to find, or develop, the educated and experienced men required for political and administrative posts, for staffing the schools, and for industry and trade. In most countries across the main body of the continent, from Dakar to Dar-es-Salaam, there are tiny elites of able, well-educated, traveled Africans—enough to provide a slate of cabinet ministers and legislators, and a handful of knowledgeable teachers. But underneath this thin top layer there is very little. . . .

"Given the shortage of trained Africans, there is acute need for holding onto European civil servants and technicians in large numbers after independence. But this is not easy. The hesitations and fears of the Europeans, where they form very small but necessary elites, constitute a problem in themselves. . . .

"European businessmen also play essential parts in the economies of these almost solidly African countries. The large concerns . . . will stay on. So will the large petroleum companies, with their widely dispersed marketing systems, and the bigger export-import concerns. Their investments are too large to pull out. But smaller businessmen and professional men, such as architects and small contractors, . . . cannot ride out the long period of stagnation induced by the uncertainties of premature independence. . . .

"No matter how great their resentments against colonialism, and however impatient their followers may be for nationalization of enterprise or Africanization of the civil services, the leaders of the new free Africa

The need for Europeans will have to deal magnanimously with their microscopic but crucial white minorities, or risk economic catastrophe.

"A bigger and more obstinate problem on the agenda of the new Africa is found in the clash of ancient tribal structures and customs with the new pattern of modern political parties. This is an uneasy and ominous coexistence. Masses of Africans are leaving their tribal environments, moving into urban centers as jobs in industry and commerce materialize. Freed from the traditional disciplines of the tribe, they tend to become a rootless proletariat. They are quick to pick up the slogans of the new political factions, led by Western-educated Africans. But the old tribal order continues outside the cities. The old chiefs, often enemies of progress and frequently enemies even of independence, retain great influence. The new political leaders are nearly all young men. And in the main, Africa is still old-fashioned; it honors age. . . .

"A long-range problem that few Africans are aware of is the rising population pressure on the land—what one Belgian colonial official characterized for me as the 'demographic catastrophe' of Africa. Sanitation and medicine have cut death rates dramatically. Nothing has cut birth rates. Thus the prospective gains of modernization, industrialization, and improved farm practices may be lost. Instead of producing higher living standards, they may only help support a fast-growing population at subsistence level.

"This is the more serious because Africa is by no means as fabulously rich a continent as is commonly supposed. Only a few restricted areas are rich in minerals. Once cleared, forest land soon deteriorates under leaching rains and turns sterile. Nowhere on the continent is there a breadbasket akin to those of southern Russia, the Mississippi Valley, and the Argentine pampas. Africa has far more than its share of insect and other pests, plus an enervating climate or lack of water or both in many regions.

"It follows that economic development will pay off in higher living standards only if it is done with great discernment—far more than was exercised in the opening of the North American continent. Africa's leaders will have to defer to experts from the white world for a long time if they are to surmount this hurdle. Sound economic planners will have to compel diversification of crops and other products to escape the present reliance on a few exports—cocoa in Ghana and Nigeria, sisal and cotton in Tanganyika, copper in the Congo, and so on.

"There is a related problem, born of the naïve enthusiasm of the new native elites coming to power. Over-eager cabinet ministers, educated but inexperienced, almost invariably fasten their attention on grandiose enterprises. Kwame Nkrumah's most urgent ambition is the Volta River power and aluminum project, which almost rivals the Aswan High Dam in magnificence of concept. He might do well to take a look at Uganda, which has a superb hydroelectric plant at the source of the Nile—but sells off most of the power into Kenya, because Ugandans can't afford electricity and the industries that were expected to absorb the power never came into being. . . .

"They should be manufacturing the goods that Africans are going to buy anyway as they pick up more cash income, and thus save that much of their import burden. But steel mills are more exciting than flashlight factories. It will take a lot of firmness and tact from the holdover British economic advisers to keep their African superiors of cabinet rank from committing such economic follies in the name of independence.

"Tied closely to this is the problem posed by the decline of investment

Tribalism

Population pressure

The need for diversification

Grandiose

Investment capital

Artificial frontiers

Language

from overseas. Countless European businessmen were happy to put their funds into colonies, because they had assurance that there would be stability, protection for their properties, and opportunity to take out profits. They may think a long time before they make similar commitments in independent African states, freed from the salutary discipline of supervision from Paris or London or Brussels. . . .

"This sudden cutting off of 'colonial investment' was a troublesome matter in Asia some years earlier. The Colombo Plan was a conscious, careful attempt to compensate for it. Africa will stumble into a similar

problem as more and more countries achieve self-rule. . . .

"The colonial powers are now granting self-government without much argument, and sometimes in the full knowledge that it is premature, because they want to avoid bitterness and thus salvage their public and private investments and their inside track in trade. They would lose that advantage, or much of it, if in turning their colonies loose they abruptly cut off these subsidies.

"Aside from these economic issues, there is a complex and perhaps insurmountable obstacle in the frontiers of African states. They are illogical, arbitrary, and mischievous. Beyond any doubt, this is a bad seed of imperialism. Boundaries were made in the chancelleries of Europe, without the slightest regard to natural economic units or to racial or tribal or linguistic lines of demarcation. . . .

"Mr. Nkrumah is surely wrong when he asserts that the colonial powers are deliberately 'Balkanizing' Africa to keep it weak. The clumsy mayhem on Africa's geography was done many years ago, for other reasons. But now there are too many prima donnas among the native African leaders to allow any easy, rational consolidation of states, or even revision of boundaries.

"To make matters worse, new linguistic frontiers have emerged. The Africans had no 'national' languages, only local. Communication among Ghanaians has to be in English if on a national scale, and in French among Congolese of different provinces. So it has come about that the French-speaking, English-speaking, and Portuguese-speaking segments of Africa are today linguistic compartments of some rigidity—even when only a modest minority of the people in any one country speak a European language.

"All in all, it is a pretty formidable agenda. It would be formidable even to a group of countries with far more resources of education and and experience. However, most of the new leaders of the emergent free Africa are sensible, moderate men, with little of the sullen anti-Westernism of Asia and Egypt. Of the major native leaders, only Sékou Touré of Guinea, with his flair for . . . brinksmanship, is openly playing the game of the Soviet bloc. As far as I can tell from informal chats with some of them, these men are intent on making an orderly, gradual transition and are eager to keep the benefits of colonialism, which include experienced administrators, able economic planners, and skilled technicians.

"Yet they are also prisoners of their own eloquence. In the process of building up popular followings they have promised the moon in a score of languages. Their chance of making a tolerable transition, of utilizing the best of colonialism while building free nations, depends on the utmost gradualism. But that may be hard to maintain, because of the promises these leaders made to millions of ignorant or naïve followers as they talked their way to power." ("The Agenda for Africa," The Reporter, June 23, 1960)

CONSENSUS ON FOREIGN POLICY

WHAT THE EXPERTS PROPOSE

During the past two years many of the nation's leading foreign affairs scholars have been quietly engaged in an intensive study of U. S. goals abroad. Nearly a score of research reports have been made for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by such organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University, the Stanford Research Institute, the Corporation for Economic and Industrial Research, Inc. Other studies have been made by private research institutions, such as the National Planning Association, the Committee for Economic Development, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. These studies, taken together, constitute the most authoritative thinking on foreign policy now available. The Foreign Policy Association —World Affairs Center, in one of its Headline series of brochures, distills the major conclusions of these reports.

The president of the Foreign Policy Association—World Affairs Center, in an introduction, defines the situation.

John W. Nason

"Every civilization has turning points when it must summon the resolution to meet new situations for which the past furnishes little precedent. The pace and scope of the revolutionary changes around us make it plain that the United States, if it is to fulfill its self-imposed assignment as leader of the non-Communist world, faces a challenge of this magnitude. This is particularly true today, now that summit negotiations have been suspended.

"There is no difference between Republicans and Democrats about the need to unite the nation on its foreign policy goals of peace with justice for the entire world. But there are differences of opinion as to the methods best calculated to achieve these goals in a period of continuing crisis."

The summary of the reports was made by Philip Van Slyck, editor of Program Materials of the FPA-Center, with the assistance of two other staff members, Grant S. McClellan, associate editor of Program Materials, and Thelma Stevens, research assistant.

Foreign Policy Association—World Affairs Center "Beyond all controversy the studies urge a reaffirmation of America's basic democratic ethos, which was once proclaimed for all the world—the eighteenth-century concept of the continuing experiment in political democracy, not for ourselves alone but also for all mankind. The root concern is freedom: its preservation, its enrichment and its extension to ever greater numbers of people throughout the world.

"With striking similarity of logic, and even of language, the bulk of the studies urge this fresh conception of our country's basic task in the world—to construct a new and viable world order in which freedom can flourish and spread. Only on such terms can our own freedom survive. And any lesser aim would betray the natural aspirations of humanity. . . .

"The premises on which this approach is based may be summarized as follows:

Our inadequate response

The need for fundamental changes "1. The natural aspiration of the human race is toward individual freedom, in free and independently developing national societies, within a pluralistic and interdependent world community.

"2. Until such a community comes into being, freedom in any part of

the world is in peril.

"3. The major threat to freedom is communism, which seeks to establish a totalitarian world order that is hostile to the individual's natural aspirations, is irreconcilable with pluralism and is incompatible with the survival of freedom—our own as well as that of other national societies.

"4. The establishment of a pluralistic world community based on consent must therefore be the long-range aim of the United States, working

in concert with other non-Communist societies. . . .

"As this common basic concept is expanded, further wide agreement among various studies emerges. All the reports, for example, expressly recognize the complex and dynamic character of the contemporary world—the rapidity of fundamental, irresistible change in all aspects of human affairs. . . . In most studies this factor of change is described as a fundamental challenge to United States foreign policy. Since change cannot be arrested, how shall we deal with it?

"So far, according to a number of reports, the United States is too closely identified with maintaining the *status quo* and too little prepared for the task of helping to direct contemporary changes into channels that

are compatible with our own aims. . . .

"The studies are virtually unanimous in concluding that the United States is responding inadequately to this complex of challenges—both as a government and as a people. Many of the reports insist that neither American leadership nor the American people fully grasp the magnitude and many-pronged nature of the Communist challenge or, indeed, of other revolutionary pressures on world affairs, such as nationalism, and the irresistible drive for economic growth in the southern two-thirds of the globe. Time and again various studies stress the urgency of overcoming this national myopia. Frequently, public apathy is attributed to failure of

public leadership. . . .

"Repeatedly the studies emphasize the long-range nature of contemporary challenges, and the need for fundamental changes in over-all strategy, as well as short-run changes in tactics, and even in the administration of foreign policy. . . . Two studies call for a drastic overhauling of policymaking and administrative machinery in order to make possible a rational and effective response to the challenges we face. Other studies focus on such problem areas as failure to comprehend or effectively counter the Soviet threat; insufficient interest or investment in free world economic growth and social and political development; inadequate attention to Allied unity and security, and to the common political, economic and military goals of the community of free nations; undue reliance on an outmoded, inflexible and inadequate military strategy; insufficient emphasis on domestic economic growth, technological development and improvement of the quality of American life-all of which are conceived as essential elements of national power and capacity. Taken as a body the recommendations add up to a change in kind as well as degree of the national effort. . . .

"Finally, all the studies share a confidence that the changes called for are possible and manageable—that they are within our reach if we are willing to make the necessary adjustments and sacrifices. . . .

"The most urgent threat to United States interests, the studies agree, lies in the many-pronged and unremitting Communist global offensive. . . .

The meaning of coexistence

Continued

struggle

Almost invariably, however, this warning is qualified. For this conflict is at the same time a challenge to U.S. and free-world policy—the challenge to create, in this fast-changing world, a pluralistic community based on freedom. The threat and the challenge are inseparable, however, since communism, too, seeks to reconstitute the world order—but along totalitarian lines. . . .

"A number of the studies . . . devote considerable space to fresh analyses of Soviet foreign-policy objectives. . . . The general consensus is that (a) Communist ideology is a powerful, but not the only, key to Soviet aims and strategy; (b) Soviet foreign-policy aims will be blunted only by an adequate free-world strategy rather than by any internal 'mellowing' (at least in the foreseeable future); and (c) Soviet foreign policy is and will continue to be aggressively expansionist on all fronts, using all available tools, not even excluding war. This, the studies seem to agree, is the real meaning of 'coexistence.' . . .

"The Senate study on United States policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe devotes considerable space to the question of whether or not Soviet society is 'mellowing' internally and, of more specific concern, 'whether it is reasonable for us to anticipate changes in the foreseeable future in the character of the objectives of Soviet foreign policy as a result of internal changes in the Soviet Union.'

"This study catalogues a number of important internal changes since the death of Stalin. Among these are improved living and working conditions—among both urban and collective farm workers—with higher incomes and reduced prices for consumer goods. Economic incentives—as opposed to coercion—are more widespread. New legal codes are more liberal, although Soviet law 'still emphasizes the protection of the State more than the civil liberties of its citizens.' The Iron Curtain is less impervious; there is evidence of intellectual ferment; and 'there has been a change in the style and in some aspects of the administration. . . .'

"Throughout the collection of studies, wherever the question of 'mellowing' Soviet society and foreign policy is raised, the conclusions are similar—that any such trend is long range, if it exists at all, and that such a trend is at least just as likely to encourage a hardening, rather than a softening, of Soviet foreign-policy objectives. . . . The prospect, therefore, is not settlement of the cold war, unless in some distant future. The prospect is rather continued struggle and, if our strategy is effective, perhaps gradual modification of Soviet aims. . . .

Relations with China

"A number of the studies discuss China problems of United States foreign policy, but only one [Asia, prepared by Conlon Associates, Ltd.] treats the topic in depth or offers detailed new approaches to our China policy. Some of the major assumptions of this latter study may be summarized as follows:

"'The [Chinese] Communists have achieved impressive results in the opening stages of their campaign for economic development, even if some claims appear to be greatly inflated. The Chinese Communists have created a powerful state in which . . . the authority of the Communist party remains supreme and unchallengeable. . . . It is extremely unlikely . . . that the present regime will be seriously challenged by internal discord in the near future. . . . Communist China is very likely to emerge as one of the world's major powers in the late twentieth century . . . [presenting] dangers to Asia and to the world. . . . The Sino-Soviet alliance is currently based

A two-stage approach to China

upon vital mutual interests. . . . Yet the long-term solidarity between the USSR and Communist China is by no means assured. Communist China regards the United States as its major opponent, and naturally it desires the reduction of American influence in Asia. There is virtually no chance that Communist China would consider any basic concessions on current issues to secure a shift in American policy. At the same time, the Chinese Communists are not in favor of war with the United States and there are also some issues, both now and in the future, that might be negotiable.'

"There are basically three courses United States policy might pursue, the study continues: '(a) containment through isolation: . . . our present policy, (b) the normalization of relations [including diplomatic recognition and] (c) exploration and negotiation'-the course recommended by

"Short-run policy alternatives toward China are lacking in creative possibilities.' There is widespread agreement that 'the central issue of American policy has practically nothing to do with the hotly debated question of recognizing the Chinese Communist regime and admitting it to UN membership on some basis or other.'...

"Recognizing that opportunities are limited, but arguing that a more flexible and constructive approach is desirable, the Senate study dealing primarily with United States China policy recommends a two-stage 'multifaceted' approach with three basic objectives: '(a) to test the willingness of Communist China to coexist with us, (b) to seek an expanded policy that would retain certain firm commitments, but also present a more dynamic, flexible and positive tone, (c) to make possible a greater degree of collective agreement on the China issue among the major nations of the free world, and hence provide a firmer basis for collective action if and when necessary.'

"The first stage would involve limited exchanges of journalists, and later, scholars and commercial representatives, plus informal discussions among leaders (but not involving the Executive branch). Simultaneously informal discussions would be held between the United States and our key allies and leading 'neutrals,' seeking cooperative thinking on the issues.

"The second stage would place United States-China trade on the same basis as United States-Soviet trade, leading, if feasible, to a United States-Chinese treaty of commerce and, later, de facto recognition of Peiping. Simultaneously, in conference with our allies and 'neutrals,' the United States would further a four-point program involving: 'Admission of Communist China to the United Nations; recognition of the Republic of Taiwan; the seating of this republic in the [UN General] Assembly; the enlargement of the Security Council to include India and Japan as permanent members, as well as China.'

"Finally, on the Red China question, there is general agreement among the studies touching on the issue that United States policy must not be based on the assumption of an early rupture between Red China and the Soviet Union, even though our policies should be prepared to capitalize on such a rupture if it develops. . . .

"In short, the area of maneuver for United States foreign policy in direct relationship to Communist China is limited, as it is in our relationship to the Soviet Union. The critical issues dividing the United States from both major Communist powers are not susceptible to solution, but only to gradual evolution.

"Our area of maneuver for indirect policy is, on the other hand, broad and susceptible to a dynamic and flexible strategy. We can, by adequate

The Sino-Soviet alliance and imaginative policies, contribute to the growth of a viable economic and political climate throughout the non-Communist world. Only by tailoring our policies to these broad objectives can we hope, in the long run, to frustrate communism's global aims and, thereby, to bring about a moderation in Soviet and Red Chinese policies. . . .

The Atlantic Community

"From whatever aspect United States foreign policy is viewed, there is unanimous agreement that the foundation stone of United States foreign policy is the Atlantic community and, especially, the North Atlantic alliance. It is on this base that the various studies propose to erect the complex structures of United States global strategy—political, economic and military.

"Politically, for example, the Atlantic partnership is generally viewed in the studies as a framework within which the free-world nations can integrate their policies, increase their interdependence, and progress toward ever greater unity as a community. Yet this solidarity should not be exclusive....

"The ultimate common interest is the construction, by consent, of a world order within which free societies can survive and flourish. The patterns of consent developed by the sovereign but interdependent nations of the Atlantic community are, therefore, integral elements of this future world order...."

The Underdeveloped World

That U.S. national interest is directly involved in the revolutionary progress of backward societies toward modern nationhood is an assumption shared by all the studies and made explicit in a majority of them.

"Several of the studies, however, display sharp disagreements on the value to free-world security of some existing military alliances with emerging nations. . . . Where the indigenous regime is repressive, static and corrupt, as for example in the three remaining Latin-American dictatorships, the studies generally agree that United States policy must reflect a delicate balance between nonintervention and clear moral support for potentially liberalizing forces.

"United States policy faces a more difficult challenge in those areas where the longer-range prospect is for a retreat from any experimentation with democracy toward totalitarianism and perhaps communism. Such a prospect is in direct conflict with our aim that the area of freedom in the world should expand, rather than contract. Communist tactics in furthering such trends are varied, flexible and difficult to counter....

"Running throughout all the studies dealing with underdeveloped lands is the theme that United States policy toward these areas must reflect an integrated approach to the broad range of problems. . . .

"In summary, it is the consensus of the studies, whatever the differences of opinion on detailed recommendations, that the industrialized democracies share a need and responsibility to undertake bold, coordinated action programs which will accelerate economic growth and social and political development throughout the non-Communist world. The scope of the effort must be vastly increased and better administered. It must be related, in the long run, to the common goal of constructing a viable and pluralistic world order in which all nations may advance toward fuller freedom and greater well-being for the individual. Only thus can we hope to avoid the alternative of an oppressive world order in which the area

Build on the NATO partnership

Support liberalizing forces

Areas of concern: India

Africa

Latin America

The Middle East

Foreign aid

of freedom would steadily diminish and perhaps ultimately disappear. . . .

"Several studies dealing with United States policy toward Asia draw particular attention to the problems and opportunities inherent in massive free world support to India's future growth. One study points to India's \$1 billion annual foreign exchange shortage, its needs in food and agricultural technology, and its latent vigor in the private sector and in small-scale enterprise. In summing up, this study declares: 'In the coming decade India may experience either a decisive breakthrough into modernization under democratic auspices and in association with the West or a critical failure which would damage, perhaps irretrievably, the prestige of democracy in India, if not in all of Asia. Given the relatively modest sums involved for both the United States and Western Europe and the enormous common costs of failure, this is an occasion for boldness and generosity.'

[Foreign Aid and You: A First Report, by The Citizens Foreign Aid Committee]

"While the various studies admit limitations on United States policy maneuverability with respect to emerging Africa, a number of significant recommendations are offered [for] the promotion of economic growth, assistance to social and political development, fostering of national independence and regional cooperation, and the handling of issues of race and color. . . .

"The 'drive toward economic development,' typical of the entire southern two-thirds of the globe, is the 'central feature of the Latin-American economy,' says one study, which then proceeds to list the principal hazards to orderly economic progress in the region. This basic analysis is paraphrased in nearly all studies dealing with Latin America.

"The rate of population growth—at 2.5 per cent or more annually, the highest in the world—is an important part of the problem. The 'demonstration effect' which, through movies, magazines and tourism, whets the Latin-American appetite for progress, is another. The disproportionate dependence on primary commodities for foreign exchange earnings further complicates the pattern. The technological lag in agriculture, which supports 50 to 60 per cent of the population, intensifies the demand for industrialization. And, finally, the intense nationalism of the private sector of Latin-American business, plus the traditional paternalism of Latin-American governments, create obstacles to needed foreign investment. . . .

"The Senate study on the Middle East... isolates several key forces and issues on which U. S. foreign policy should focus, and describes as the 'supreme Western objective' the maintenance of 'the stability of the area.' Among the pressures affecting the Middle East, Arab nationalism is the 'central force.' This nationalism, which 'does not pull strongly in the direction of Arab unity,' means different things to different Arab peoples and leaders, and is a source of rivalry within and among Arab states....

The Redirection of Economic Aid

"On the basic directions of United States economic policy . . . the bulk of the studies are in fundamental agreement. They agree, in fact, that a large measure of redirection is now necessary, as well as more rational use of domestic and free-world economic capacity in the service of mutual objectives.

"In the foreign aid field, the consensus focuses on 1) increased United States interest and investment in accelerated economic growth in the underdeveloped areas; 2) emphasis on long-term programs of major significance; 3) coordination of aid programs of the industrialized democracies; 4) more effective use of multilateral organizations and channels;

Trade

Balance of payments

Defense remains basic

5) tailoring of capital transfers to the absorptive capacities of receiving countries; 6) increased participation by the receiving countries in national and regional planning for development; 7) divorcement of United States economic aid from military or political conditions; 8) recognition of free world economic and political stakes in global economic growth.

"In the area of trade there is a fundamental agreement that United States policies should be directed toward 1) expansion and liberalization of free world trade; 2) adjustment of United States short-term economic interests (dislocation or hardship in a single United States industry) to United States and free-world long-term interests (expansion of over-all trade); 3) avoidance of protectionist measures which tend to contract rather than expand trade; 4) strengthening and enlarging of regional marketing arrangements that do not in themselves raise protectionist barriers to trade, and United States participation in such regional arrangements on mutually beneficial terms; 5) cooperation with other surplusproducing nations in the creation of policies and agencies which will tend to (a) promote the flow of foods, fibers and other surplus commodities from surplus to deficit areas without adverse effects on commercial trade; (b) stabilize world market prices for these commodities; and (c) discourage overproduction, or sensitize production to real market demand. . . .

"Emerging economies are more dependent than the United States on commodity exports for their foreign exchange earnings. Unless the chronic nature of this international problem is remedied, through international cooperation, a substantial proportion of all aid to underdeveloped lands serves only to 'bail out' these economies from balance-of-payments deficits. It thus contributes little to genuine economic growth. . .

"Several studies warn specifically against the present U. S. policy of tying foreign aid to U. S. exports. Among the acceptable alternatives are 1) continued United States pressure on its major trading partners, especially Western Europe and Japan, to eliminate out-of-date restrictions against United States goods; 2) invigoration of United States export efforts; 3) assumption by Western Europe and Japan of a larger share of the burden of economic aid to underdeveloped areas. . . .

Defense, Deterrence and Disarmament

"An adequate United States defense strategy is viewed by all studies dealing with the subject as a necessary precondition to success in any other area of foreign policy. Without an effective deterrent to war, and, in a showdown, without both the willingness to wage and the capacity to survive war, all other foreign-policy objectives are ephemeral.

"The studies agree overwhelmingly that, since World War II, United States military policy has been sound in its broad outlines—a policy designed 'to insure if possible that the conflict with the Soviet Union will be conducted on other planes than military'-a strategy, in other words, of deterrence. . . . There is also wide agreement in the studies, however, that the United States does not now have-or is in grave danger of losing-an effective deterrent. Present force levels and defense-offense capabilities, as well as the inflexible strategy dictated by our present defense limitations, constitute a dangerous weakness, according to a number of the studies. Our deterrent may be neither real nor credible.

"Lacking a 'dual capacity,' or the ability to make a 'discriminating' response to various kinds and levels of attack, the United States is limited to only one kind of armed action-massive retaliation. In other words, in the face of aggressive pressure, we have only two alternatives-to give in or to precipitate total war. The situation is further complicated by our insistence that we will never strike first. Our strategy assumes that, even after we are hit by surprise, we shall still have the capacity to hit back devastatingly. The strategy, however, may not even be credible to the Soviet Union since we have taken few active measures to protect our retaliatory power and no passive measures to protect our people and industry.

"A few of the studies place some credence in the 'balance of terror'—the assumption that the Soviet leaders are unlikely to make a rational and deliberate decision to precipitate total war. Yet nearly all the studies assume that total war remains a possibility, however remote, for which the United States cannot afford to be unprepared. . . . The studies tend to be highly critical of current United States defense capabilities. There are few significant disagreements among the studies. Only one, for example, views the contemporary generation of nuclear weapons as 'ultimate' in a strategic sense; the others envisage future weapons generations of greater horror, and place great emphasis on the possibility and portent of further technological 'breakthroughs,' either offensive or defensive.

"In their fundamental analyses the studies are in accord. They condemn current United States strategy for its inflexible reliance on an inadequately dispersed and unprotected retaliatory power. They deplore our insufficient attention to weapons research and development and our apparent unwillingness to consider military power as an instrument of diplomacy. Finally they find us least prepared to wage and win (or to contain) the kind of war we shall most likely have to fight—limited war.

"Several studies also devote considerable attention to reorganization and strengthening of the United States military establishment at the administrative, decision-making and strategic planning levels. Widespread concern is also expressed for better coordination of political and military policies within the core alliance system, NATO....

"The consensus seems to be that disarmament or arms control is not a rational objective in itself, since it would not insure political stability, and could, in fact, create greater instability than we now enjoy. The studies also emphasize that arms control is not an alternative to military security, but should rather be viewed as part of a reasonable over-all strategy. The purpose of this over-all strategy would be to achieve that measure of arms control plus military defense which introduces into international relations a relatively greater stability than can be anticipated from a continuation of the arms race. . . .

"The point is also made in several studies that any conceivable degree of arms control would not result in a net saving in resources. The security levels at each stage of a phased program, plus the costly inspection and control network that would need to be constructed, could cost as much as or more than present military budgets. Future technological developments, especially in the area of 'weird weapons,' will also require constant modifications of any proposed inspection system. . . .

"The challenge, in short, is not to achieve disarmament for its own sake or at any cost, but rather to press seriously for a political as well as technological framework within which an arms control agreement would contribute to international stability. This, in the final analysis, is the ultimate foreign-policy objective for the United States—the construction of a viable and pluralistic world community in which freedom is secure and can flourish." (U. S. Foreign Policy Goals: What Experts Propose, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, July-August 1960. Available through Readers Service)

The capacity for limited war

Arms control as over-all strategy

THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

MOBILIZING FOR DISARMAMENT

In a statement marking the fifteenth anniversary of the explosion of the first nuclear weapon, at Alamagordo, N. M., the Federation of American Scientists declares it "unlikely that the world will avoid a nuclear holocaust if another fifteen years pass without arms control agreements."

Federation of American Scientists "A nation may propose arms control to prevent or minimize the horror of war, to strengthen its relative military position, or to gain a propaganda victory. Unless both sides seek arms control agreements for the first purpose no very useful agreement is possible. Although it has been United States policy to seek arms control as a method of preventing war, we have not supported that policy with the necessary conviction and devotion. . . .

"Our best efforts towards arms control will be unavailing if the Soviet Union is intransigent. But... our efforts have not been complete enough for us to be confident that we would have found a basis for agreement if such existed. Our government has not undertaken on a sufficient scale the hard work and intensive research that are necessary for an informed political judgment on specific arms control proposals. Our country is unquestionably in favor of disarmament in principle. But we seem to fear specific steps because we do not know what risk or gain each such step may imply.

"In short, we have failed to organize the basic information and critical and creative thought necessary to the formulation of arms control proposals based on clear recognition of facts. Furthermore, we are unable to anticipate or analyze adequately such counterproposals as the Russians have offered or may yet offer.

"It seems at least probable that the Soviet leaders now share our belief in the value and importance to both our nations—as well as to the rest of the world—of achieving some arms limitation. If this is true our failure to do all that can be done toward seeking such agreements may be a tragic failure indeed." (July 16, 1960)

Drastic reorganization of the United States approach to the problems of disarmament is urged by the Committee on Security Through Arms Control of the National Planning Association.

National Planning Association "Failure to harmonize defense and disarmament objectives has led to confusion in our security policies. Furthermore, lack of organized preparation for disarmament conferences has aggravated the risks inherent in negotiation. We have repeatedly found ourselves . . . with jerry-built policies and hastily recruited spokesmen. We have thus frequently been caught off balance—in presenting our case to our opponents, to the world at large, and even to our allies. These inadequacies have been acquiesced in by both postwar administrations, and by the leadership of both political parties. . . .

"Sometimes disarmament proposals will be espoused in a genuine effort to achieve an agreement on the precise terms in which they are offered; sometimes they will be mere invitations to bargain.... To distinguish beNegotiation without preparation

Training negotiators on the job

tween valid offers and propaganda moves, and to frame acceptances, rejections, rejoinders, and counterproposals . . . requires familiarity with military strategy, technology, and weapons development as well as with foreign policy, world politics, and science.

"Clearly this is worth the full-time attention of a staff of highly trained specialists of many different backgrounds; the frequent counsel of experts in all phases of government policy; and the continuous interest of the

highest officers of government. . .

"The United States Government has not developed a sufficient corps of professional experts in the arms control field; it has not even evolved fundamental policy objectives. . . . We have gone into each successive disarmament conference with positions hastily and often superficially prepared. . . . On occasion, differences between departments . . . or . . . between our government and our allies have not been reconciled until mid-conference. . . .

"On May 6, 1960, the White House announced that it had authorized a program to develop methods of detecting underground tests; as part of this program . . . underground explosions would be conducted. . . . Neither among the press corps nor among the President's staff at Gettysburg were there any experts on arms control or science matters. As a result the news went out as a straight announcement that the United States would resume nuclear testing. This statement provoked protests throughout the world, as it was interpreted as an abrogation of the test moratorium. On the following Wednesday, President Eisenhower personally corrected this erroneous impression. But U.S. prestige had been damaged, and in Geneva the Russians were able to gain some propaganda advantage. . . .

The Need for Knowledge

"Arms control is not an amateur's game. To plan or negotiate intelligently, one must have an intimate knowledge of what has gone on before; of the spoken and unspoken thoughts of other powers; of the individuals who make up the working teams of foreign countries; of military forces and strategy; of the technology of the weapons of yesterday, today, and tomorrow; of the workings of the United States Government; and of our diplomatic problems on related questions. . . .

"Yet the only continuous features of our efforts in the disarmament field have been a lack of continuity in top personnel and paucity of planning and research efforts. The composition of American delegations to disarmament conferences follows a pattern. The head of the delegation is a distinguished citizen recruited from private life. Usually he leaves his business

... a month or two before the conference. . . .

"In the course of a lengthy conference he will learn a great deal about his staff, about disarmament, and about the negotiating process in general. When he returns, he will be on his way to expertise. But when the next conference takes place, someone else will head the delegation. . . .

"The Russian teams are composed of men who have had long experience in both arms control and American affairs, who are veterans of other international conferences, and who are well-grounded in languages, weapons systems, and previous disarmament negotiations. . . .

"The tasks involved in arms control work can be divided into five types: Presidential decisions, arms control policy planning, research in support of arms control policy planning, negotiations, operations. . . .

"Policy can be effectively created only by personal decisions of the President. These problems cannot successfully be delegated because they cut across the jurisdiction of several key departments of government. . . . The

Defense Department cannot be expected to propose that certain military guarantors of security be abandoned in favor of diplomatic guarantors. The State Department cannot overrule a firm opinion of the military upon a defense matter. Nor can the Defense Department overrule the State Department on foreign-policy problems. . . .

"It is true that the National Security Council provides a forum where these departmental views can be further discussed and refined. But in this forum, too, the decision-making power rests in the person of the President.

... But the President can be aided by administrative arrangements that will enable him more expeditiously to analyze the problems, weigh the alternatives, and use the resources of all of the interested ... agencies....

A Staff to Plan Policy

"The primary need in arms control policy planning is to provide the President with much stronger staff support." This staff should collect and analyze scientific, military, technological, and political information; evaluate capabilities and intentions; devise proposals and analyze them from the point of view of powers on both sides; weigh alternative systems of security and arms control; examine arms control techniques . . . ; consider the opinions of allies so as to develop coordinated policies.

There are a number of possible locations for this staff. A new cabinet-level peace agency has been suggested; it would gain public attention for the needs to be filled and emphasize the grand scale on which the necessary machinery must be conceived. But it would also fragment the conduct of foreign relations. An inter-agency committee—the device now in use for arms control policy planning—is unsatisfactory because it lacks the power of decision where disagreement exists.

The State Department already has a small group of experts in the field, and there is justification for concentrating the conduct of international relations in the hands of the Secretary of State; moreover, the State Department has responsibility for the conduct of negotiations, including disarmament negotiations. But the normal activities of the State Department are concerned with operations which follow established patterns; basic questions are the province of the President.

The State Department's personnel policy of creating "diplomatic generalists" also makes it difficult to develop specialists in arms control, which requires intense study of technical problems. The Department of Defense has the technical staff needed for the work, but its inherent bias in favor of reliance on military means of guaranteering national security rules it out for the job of planning disarmament policy.

A final alternative is the creation of a staff in the Executive Office of the President. It has been objected that the head of such a staff might clash with the Secretary of State; he might lack sufficient authority and prestige; he might make decisions arbitrarily, without adequate consultations with the interested agencies. But the arms control problem is peculiarly a Presidential responsibility, and the President needs assistance in reconciling the advice he receives from the State Department and from the defense agencies. Some of the difficulties could be avoided by making the head of the staff a director, rather than a Presidential assistant. Placing the staff in the Executive Office would have the advantage of separating the planning and operational functions.

"But no matter where the staff is placed, there is no substitute for Presidential leadership. It should not be the task of a policy staff to insulate the President from all worries and cares on arms control problems, but rather

Placing the planners

to present him with pros and cons of alternative courses of action, and to enable him to delegate preparatory work. . . .

"The policy planning group should have sufficient staff support so that it can, when necessary, rely upon its own resources for all major analysis and planning.... When it is engaged in a discussion with another agency, it should not be placed in the impossible position (as the State Department has sometimes been) of asking one of the contending agencies to provide scientific data that would contradict its own thesis....

"The negotiating function requires many skills that are quite different from those used in the policy planning function. For this reason, many suggest that it should be kept separate from the policy functions so that, even if a White House office were created for policy planning, the State Department would retain responsibility for negotiating and for public information.... The State Department has both experience and a clear-cut responsibility for treaty-making.... Finally, arms control is related to many other issues with which the State Department is currently dealing.

"Further, it is desirable that negotiations on arms control matters should, to the greatest degree possible, be carried on through normal diplomatic channels, on an embassy-to-foreign-office basis. For on this basis, discussions could be conducted without artificial deadlines, the logistics of transporting staffs and facilities, the insistent annoyances of journalists who are under pressure to magnify the importance of minor matters, and the hazard of propaganda repercussions. . . .

The Task of Enforcement

"After a disarmament treaty has been adopted, there will be new tasks concerned primarily with enforcement, inspection, maintenance of records, and preparation of reports. . . . Regardless of the type of inspection organ that comes into being, additional jobs will fall on the shoulders of the individual participating governments. . . .

"As controllee, the government will be obliged to take certain actions and to make reports thereon. It will accord controllers access and safe conduct, and will answer interrogatories or charges of violation. For this purpose it will establish channels of liaison.

"As controller, a government would maintain relations with the central office of the control body and participate in its direction. . . . [It] would continue certain lawful independent activities to detect violations and to satisfy itself of the reliability of the control."

The operating responsibilities under a treaty would differ in nature from the planning, research, and decision-making required in the pre-treaty stage. The operating agency would make contributions to policy planning, maintain a headquarters to control inspection operations and field inspection and liaison units to work with the control organization, and carry on research and development work on detection methods.

While the danger exists that the military would be reluctant and uninspired in arms control operations, the Defense Department is probably the only place where it would be possible, without great expense and difficulty, to obtain people with the requisite technical skills and the necessary willingness to go to remote posts. And it is desirable to give the Defense Department an opportunity to learn the importance of arms control to a security system, and to acquire a vested interest in supporting it. ("Strengthening the Government for Arms Control," A Report of the Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control of the National Planning Association, June 27, 1960)

Let State negotiate

Controllee and controller

SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ISSUES

Each month Current publishes a lengthy reprint or condensation of material that seems to the editors of outstanding interest.

In the verbatim extracts below, the responsibility of the scientific community in a modern democracy is discussed by the AAAS Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare. Committee members are Barry Commoner, Washington University, chairman; Robert B. Brode, University of California, Berkeley; Harrison Brown, California Institute of Technology; T. C. Byerly, Agricultural Research Service; Laurence K. Frank, Belmont, Mass.; H. Jack Geiger, Harvard Medical School; Frank W. Notestein, Population Council; Margaret Mead, American Museum of Natural History; and Dael Wolfle, executive officer, AAAS editorial staff.

American Association for the Advancement of Science For nearly two decades, scientists have viewed with growing concern the troublesome events that have been evoked by the interaction between scientific progress and public affairs. With each advance in our knowledge of nature, science adds to the already immense power that the social order exerts over human welfare. With each increment in power, the problem of directing its use toward beneficial ends becomes more complex, the consequences of failure more disastrous, and the time for decision more brief.

The problem is not new, either in the history of human affairs or of science. What is without past parallel is its urgency.

Four years ago, the report of the AAAS Interim Committee on the Social Aspects of Science stated: "We are now in the midst of a new and unprecedented scientific revolution which promises to bring about profound changes in the condition of human life. The forces and processes now coming under human control are beginning to match in size and intensity those of nature itself, and our total environment is now subject to human influence. In this situation it becomes imperative to determine that these new powers shall be used for the maximum human good, for, if the benefits to be derived from them are great, the possibility of harm is correspondingly serious."

The Interim Committee also concluded that "there is an impending crisis in the relationships between science and American society. This crisis is being generated by a basic disparity. At a time when decisive economic, political, and social processes have become profoundly dependent on science, the discipline has failed to attain its appropriate place in the management of public affairs."

In the last few years the disparity between scientific progress and the resolution of the social issues which it has evoked has become even greater. What was once merely a minor gap now threatens to become a major discontinuity which may disrupt the history of man.

Recent events have lent substance to the conviction of our committee and of its antecedent groups—and we believe to that of scientists generally—that scientists bear a serious and immediate responsibility to help mediate the effects of scientific progress on human welfare. . . .

Now, as in 1956, our premises are these:

1. We are witnessing an unprecedented growth in the scale and intensity of scientific work.

2. This growth has been stimulated by an intense demand for the practical products of research, especially for military and industrial use.

3. The public interest in, and understanding of, science is not commensurate with the importance that science has attained in our social structure. It cannot be said that society provides good conditions for the proper growth of science.

4. For reasons such as those just cited, science is experiencing a period of rapid but rather unbalanced growth. Basic research, which is the ultimate source of the practical results so much in demand, is poorly supported and, in the view of some observers, lacks vigor and quality.

5. The growth of science and the great enhancement of the degree of control which we now exert over nature have given rise to new social practices, of great scope and influence, which make use of new scientific knowledge. While this advance of science has greatly improved the condition of human life, it has also generated new hazards of unprecedented magnitude.

Since 1956 this general pattern has taken on some new features which concern us at this time.

1. The conscious exploitation of science for military advantage continues at an accelerating rate. But in recent years this process has merged with another, equally important trend: science is being pressed into the service of international politics. Scientific accomplishment per se has become an accepted—and at present dominant—factor of prestige among nations. The philosophy of "getting ahead of the Russians" (or Americans), which once referred only to military matters, now includes scientific achievements as well. This rivalry has strongly motivated the recent intensification of government support for scientific research.

2. The rapid emergence of political independence among the "underdeveloped" nations of the world, and their natural desire to exploit modern technology, has added to the importance of international exchange of scientific knowledge and personnel. Perhaps one reason for the rivalry for scientific pre-eminence among the more advanced nations is the expecta-

tion of political advantage from this exchange.

3. Certain recent scientific advances add directly to the ease with which our knowledge of nature can be applied to the control of human beings and of social organization. Development of new psychotomimetic drugs and psychological techniques have suggested, to some, effective means for controlling the behavior of social groups. Progress in the science of cybernetics and the development of automation techniques result in new capabilities for direct control of social and economic processes.

bilities for direct control of social and economic processes.

4. Despite some recent effort toward improvement, there is no reason to alter the earlier conclusion that our present social environment does not favor the development of an understanding of science, or of science's aims and needs. The increasingly spectacular practical achievements of science have only accentuated misconceptions about the relative significance, for the growth of science, of practical results and the advancement of basic knowledge. To many people physical science means nuclear energy and rockets. The public is sometimes led to expect that biological and medical research will conquer every human ailment—will overcome death. There is a tendency to equate scientific progress with a sum of money and a

Political exploitation of science

Control of human beings

number of people. There is insufficient appreciation of the significance of basic research, or of the conditions in which it can flourish.

The situation appears to be this: We are witnessing an unprecedented and accelerating rate of growth in man's power over his environment. Science, the instrument which produces this power, is being consciously exploited for industrial, military, and political purposes. At the same time there is little recognition of the internal needs of science, or of its purposes as a discipline of the human mind.

In this situation it is inevitable that the inner strength of science should suffer, for what is essential to the proper growth of science is often in conflict with the conditions of its service to military and political affairs.

An important example of this effect is the matter of "competition." The military and political advantages, to a nation, of scientific progress within its own borders are self-evident. Yet, it is a truism—but nevertheless a vital one—that nature is the same everywhere, and that the study of nature is an activity of the whole human race. Any effort to divide science into fragments which are delimited by national boundaries, and dominated by a local social philosophy, will inevitably restrict the free discovery and communication of new knowledge that is the substance of scientific progress. A "nationalistic" science is an anachronism which cannot long continue without damage to science and eventually to the nation.

What, then, is the scientist's responsibility to his own nation's scientific effort? Clearly, we need to understand that what science contributes to the national purpose is measured by what it adds to the sum of human knowledge; science serves the nation by serving humanity.

A further examination of the effects of the present social uses of science on life inside the house of science itself leads to even more disturbing conclusions. There is some evidence that the integrity of science is beginning to erode under the abrasive pressure of its close partnership with economic, social, and political affairs.

In recent controversies about fallout and the detection of nuclear explosions, partisanship on the part of some scientists for a particular political approach to the problem has been so intense in some instances as to cloud—at least in the public mind—the identity between science and an objective regard for the facts.

The grim international competition for "supremacy" in scientific accomplishment also endangers the integrity of science. Unseemly claims of priority may be encouraged. Premature reports of new scientific discoveries, which will occur to some extent in any circumstances, may be permitted to acquire a semblance of credibility.

An illustration—as yet unrealized—is the matter of "the creation of life." Some scientists believe that the properties of life are inherent in the chemistry of nucleic acid, and would regard the artificial synthesis of a reproducible nucleic acid or nucleoprotein molecule—which may occur in the reasonably near future—as the "creation" of life. Other scientists would disagree with this interpretation because they believe that nucleic acid, nucleoprotein, or anything less than a living cell is not "life," for the reason that it is not a self-sufficient replicative agent.

Under ordinary circumstances this difference of opinion would be occasionally debated among scientists and finally resolved when the weight of evidence on one side or the other became sufficiently strong, or when a new and more acceptable idea emerged. However, in the present circumstances this matter may take another course. There is some

Science is not national

Erosion of integrity

A race

evidence that a claimed "creation of life" based on the test-tube synthesis of an infectious molecule might be regarded by a government as a scientific accomplishment of great political importance—a kind of "biological Sputnik." In this case, scientists may be hard pressed to persuade government officials—and perhaps even some of their colleagues—that the discovery should be given an interpretation which is less dramatic but more in keeping with the divided scientific opinion of its significance.

It is evident that the accelerating progress of science has evoked a number of serious problems that affect both the social order and the internal situation of our scientific establishment. Having become a major instrument in political affairs, science is inseparably bound up with many troublesome questions of public policy. That science is valued more for these uses than for its fundamental purpose—the free inquiry into nature—leads to pressures which have begun to threaten the integrity of science itself. . . .

The scientific community is faced with numerous problems that very seriously affect the development of science and the future of society. How have scientists responded to this challenge?

Since World War II there has been a considerable growth in scientists' participation in political affairs. The growth has been intermittent and based on a variety of views of the scientists' relation to social problems.

The Federation of American Scientists, initiated by scientists involved in the wartime atomic bomb project, is frankly designed to give scientists a direct voice in discussions of political matters that relate to science. The Pugwash movement and the less formal groupings represented by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists take the view that scientists can serve a useful function in proposing political solutions to the international problems that result from the applications of modern science. This approach results in a deliberate effort, on the part of these scientists, to persuade Government agencies to follow a recommended course of action. A third group is typified by the Society for Social Responsibility in Science, which takes the view that scientists have a moral responsibility to try to limit to ethical uses the applications of science and technology.

In the 1956 Presidential campaign, ad hoc groups of proponents for both political parties developed among scientists. During the past year both parties have organized scientific advisory committees, which will presumably provide the "scientific authority" for the positions that these parties will take in the 1960 campaign.

Finally, some scientists take the view that their proper role with respect to questions of policy that are related to science is to bring to public attention the relevant facts and scientific principles and an explanation of the limits of accuracy and alternate interpretations that apply. Thus informed, the citizen is prepared to make his own choice between possible solutions. This approach has been the basis for the formation in St. Louis of the Citizens Committee for Nuclear Information, a group of scientists and citizens devoted to the dissemination of information about the radiation problem. A group of scientists with a similar purpose, the Scientists Committee for Radiation Information, has been organized in New York City under the auspices of the New York Academy of Science.

This account shows that scientists are trying to meet their social responsibilities in a variety of ways. It also suggests that no single approach has as yet won the active participation of more than a very small part of the scientific community. Nor has there been a sustained development of these activities. Indeed, in the last few years activity on these matters within the scientific community has been relatively slight. . . .

Influencing the public

Informing the public The problems

for scientists

When scientists don't know

This committee and its antecedent groups have developed a distinctive approach to the matter of how scientists and their professional organizations (and in particular the AAAS) can best function with respect to the public issues that involve the progress of science.

To begin with, we suggest that the issues fall into two classes with respect to where, in our social structure, their ultimate solutions lie. Certain problems-for example, the effects of public policy on the development of science itself-are matters in which scientists, as scientists, have a particular interest, responsibility, and experience. In the solution of these problems, the opinions of the scientific community should carry some special weight, and scientists should accept the obligation to develop and explain these opinions.

The more difficult problems are those which do not so exclusively concern scientists but which have a broad relation to public policy and affect all citizens equally. An example of such a problem is public policy in relation to nuclear energy, but this is only the most obvious of a growing class of troublesome issues.

It is our view that such problems are in essence social and political. We expect the choice among alternative solutions of these problems to be made through the normal, democratic processes of social and political decision-making, in which all citizens participate.

In this respect the general issues that relate to scientific developments do not differ from other social and political questions. The difference between them lies at a less fundamental level. In the case of the more familiar questions of public policy, the facts which the citizen, or the government official, requires to make an informed choice between alternative solutions are relatively accessible and the consequences of different solutions are more or less apparent. On the other hand, the factual background and implications of the issues with which we are concerned involve scientific and technical data, often in areas relatively new to science, which are in themselves complex. Many citizens are neither familiar with science generally nor well informed about the specific developments which are at the root of present public issues. Scientists as well as other citizens often lack the relevant scientific facts and are unable to visualize the effects of alternative courses of action. In these circumstances, there is little reason to hope for informed decisions about questions of public policy that relate to science.

In our view, this deficiency is a major cause of the difficulties that now impede the proper development of public policy on science-related issues. This conclusion can be documented in detail from recent experience regarding public policies on radiation hazards, food additives and insecticides, the significance of space exploration, the nature of modern warfare, the population question. This list also illustrates the importance which such issues have assumed in public affairs.

The foregoing analysis leads to a distinctive view of the part which the scientist and his professional organizations should play in the social processes involved in the resolution of science-related issues.

With respect to the process of decision-making, the scientist's role is simply that of an informed citizen. Like any other citizen, the scientist is free to express his opinions regarding alternative solutions for matters of public policy and will perhaps join with like-minded citizens in a group effort to foster the solution he prefers. This role does not derive from the scientist's professional competence or obligations but only from his citiDetecting incipient problems

Advising the government zenship, and therefore it bears no direct relationship to his professional organizations.

But in the matter of providing citizens with the knowledge required to make informed decisions on science-related public issues, the scientist and his organizations have both a unique competence and a special responsibility. As the producer and custodian of scientific knowledge, the scientific community has the obligation to impart such knowledge to the public.

The scientific community has another special competence (which derives naturally from its concern with new and potentially significant attributes of nature), for attempting to detect incipient problems before they become unnecessarily acute. For example, the likelihood that the relation between nutrition and the development of cancer would eventually become a practical problem for the food industry—a matter which is at present agitating farmers and food processors—has been apparent from the work of investigators in many countries for the past fifteen to twenty years.

Early detection of such problems is one of the most important direct contributions science can make toward their solution. Too often the most serious obstacle to the solution of such issues is that they are recognized only after the commitment of massive and essentially irreversible economic and social investments. If the Los Angeles area were now about to be settled, it would be a relatively simple matter, given our present knowledge about the causes of smog, to make plans that would prevent a future smog problem. How much more costly is the real situation, which may require that an entire community's reliance on gasoline-powered transport be altered! In its fields of competence, foresight is a capability and, in our view, a responsibility of the scientific community.

It follows, then, that the scientific community should accept the obligation to determine how new advances in our understanding and control of natural forces are likely to affect human welfare, to call these matters to public attention, and to provide for the public and its social and political agencies the objective statements of the facts and of the consequences of alternative policies that are required as the basis for informed decisions on the relative merits of proposed courses of action.

At what point in the social process should the scientific community enter as an agency of information? One view is that, since most social decisions are executed by government, the scientist's function is to inform and advise government departments and officials. The government does, of course, need such advice, and a number of useful methods of providing it have been evolved. In these instances, scientists serve only by invitation. Inevitably, the general content of the information that is provided and the tenor of the advice that is offered are to some degree conditioned by the particular interests of the requesting agency, which determines what questions are asked and who is given an opportunity to answer them.

Such a relationship does not wholly fulfill the scientist's social role, as we see it. In dealing with social issues, the scientific community must demonstrate its responsibility and its inherent regard for truth and objectivity and must zealously preserve the freedom of thought and communication that is essential to the pursuit of these goals. Accordingly, we believe that the scientific community ought to assume, on its own initiative, an *independent* and *active* informative role, whether or not other social agencies see any immediate advantage in hearing what the scientist has to say.

We believe, also, that what scientists have to say about the social implications of science should be addressed directly to the general public. Our traditional preference for democratic procedures requires that the citizen be sufficiently informed to decide for himself what is to be done about the issues that scientific progress has thrust upon us. Furthermore, our command over natural forces—for example, the destructive potential of nuclear war—is now so great as to create social and moral questions of such great moment that no social agency ought to intervene between the issue and the public.

In sum, we conclude that the scientific community should, on its own initiative, assume an obligation to call to public attention those issues of public policy which relate to science, and to provide for the general public the facts and estimates of the effects of alternative policies which the citizen must have if he is to participate intelligently in the solution of these problems. A citizenry thus informed is, we believe, the chief assurance that science will be devoted to the promotion of human welfare.

Many specific problems command the attention of scientists who are concerned with meeting their responsibility to mediate the interaction between science and society. In choosing certain issues for emphasis, we have adopted the view that it is more important to learn how to deal with the difficult problems than with the simpler ones.

The problems presented below have been chosen with this in mind. . . .

- 1. The social consequences of technological progress. It is characteristic of the present situation that scientific advances lead to a very profound level of control over our environment and to widespread effects on nature. Often the benefits which are the original aim of a particular application of science are accompanied by secondary effects that cause unanticipated harm. The application of new scientific advances calls for social decisions which weigh the benefits against the disadvantages, and the public needs to have the facts relevant to such a decision. The scientific community faces an immediate need for developing the necessary educational programs. Important examples of such problems include: (1) the general effects of technological advances, such as that of automation on industrial development, or of rapid social changes on health; (2) the effects of radiation from military and peaceful applications of nuclear energy; (3) the effects of new organic insecticides, food additives, and food colors on animals and man; (4) artificial control of the weather; and (5) population control.
- 2. The association of scientific research and military activities. Military usefulness is, at present, a dominant motivation in the social support of scientific research and has a profound effect on the development of our scientific establishment. Any significant change in the pattern of military activities—disarmament, for example—is likely to cause serious changes in research opportunities. The close association of science with recent military advances tends to foster a public image of science and the scientist which is not in keeping with the inherent goals of the discipline. The secrecy associated with military applications may restrict the development of science. Some observers regard the problem of preventing the catastrophic application of the power of science in war as a matter which overshadows all others.

There is an obvious need for the scientific community to give attention to the wide range of problems arising from the close linkage of science and military activity. The role of science in possible efforts toward dis-

Social consequences

Research and the military

Government support of research

> Integrity is basic

armament and the practical impact of disarmament on scientific research are of immediate concern.

- 3. International aspects of science. Science figures prominently in the intense political rivalry among the major nations of the world. This use of science tends to conflict with its basic international character, and means must be found to resolve this difficulty. A useful innovation has been the development of collaborative international scientific programs, such as those associated with UNESCO, the World Health Organization, CERN, [Centre Européen pour les Recherches Nucléaires] and the IGY. A number of proposals for similar programs in medicine, space research, and oceanography have been made. This area is a fruitful field for developing new ways to foster a sound development of collaborative science. Of particular importance are international programs to provide scientific and technological assistance to underdeveloped nations.
- 4. Government support for scientific research. This problem has received considerable attention in the last few years, but . . . no adequate solution is in sight. The basic difficulties seem to be the absence of any over-all rationale in the support of science and the overemphasis on projects that give promise of immediate practical results. We find, as a consequence of this emphasis, that the major part of governmental research support (about 87 per cent in the projected 1961 budget) is in the military area, that basic research is inadequately supported, that the pattern of support is not conducive to the development of free inquiry into nature, and that the narrow base of support is distorting the development of science as a whole, in our universities in particular. . . .
- 5. How can scientists best meet their social responsibilities? From what has been said above it is clear that the scientific community has not yet developed a widely accepted means of performing its function in connection with public issues related to science. It would be useful, therefore, to stimulate discussion among scientists on how such activity can best be developed and to encourage efforts which seem to promise success.
- 6. The integrity of science. As science becomes more deeply involved in the frequently discordant affairs of public life and in highly competitive social endeavors, we may expect a growing pressure toward relaxation of the traditional rules for the conduct of science: objective, open communication of results; rigorous distinction between fact and hypothesis; candid recognition of assumptions and sources of error. It is these rules which permit science to progressively increase our understanding of and control over nature. Without them science becomes useless, and even dangerous to the social order. If the scientific community is to accept the obligation to participate in public affairs, means must be found to strengthen the discipline's rules of conduct. Some observers favor the adoption of a code of ethics; others propose less direct means of maintaining scientific objectivity. To begin with, there is a clear need for candid discussion of this problem....

The task is not an easy one. It will add to the scientist's burden of work; it will require from the citizen more attention to public affairs; it will demand new social inventions. But we believe that a society capable of producing the enormous new powers of science ought to be capable of finding the means of comprehending their effects on the social order. And we are confident that with such understanding, science-as an expression of the creative gifts of the human mind-will flourish, and the power which it endows will be turned more fully to the promotion of human welfare.

("Science and Human Welfare," Science, July 8, 1960)

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